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Which countries are most open to international trade? 
Tariff averages have frequently been used to measure the height of 
trade barriers, but the rise in the relative importance of nontariff bar- 
riers has made tariff averages increasingly suspect as overall measures 
of  barriers.  Coverage  ratios  for nontariff barriers,  such as those  in 
Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters (1986), are suggestive of the severity 
of nontariff barriers, but  not all  nontariff barriers can be measured, 
and not all barriers are equally restrictive. Furthermore, it is unclear 
how tariff averages and nontariff coverage ratios should be combined. 
In selected cases such as Pryor (1966), Sampson and Yeats (1977), and 
Cline et al. (1978), tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers can be formed 
by comparing the foreign with the domestic price of goods.  But data 
for forming tariff equivalents are very limited, and tariff equivalents 
are accurate indicators of the height of barriers only for the competitive 
case in which the product is standardized and there is no market power. 
An alternative approach is to examine trade data for circumstantial 
evidence of barriers. In the traditional small-country micromodel, trade 
in particular products is a function of resource supplies, prices of prod- 
ucts  in  international  markets,  technology, tastes, natural barriers to 
trade, and artificial barriers. When studying trade patterns for evidence 
of  artificial barriers it is therefore important either to assure that the 
other determinants of trade are relatively constant or to control statis- 
tically for their variability. For example, changes over time of the ratio 
of  imports to domestic consumption (or production) can properly be 
attributed  to changes in  artificial barriers only if  resource  supplies, 
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product prices, technologies, tastes, and natural barriers to trade are 
adequately constant. Differences among countries in the level and com- 
modity composition of trade can be attributed to barriers if the countries 
are sufficiently similar in terms of resources, tastes, and natural barriers 
to trade, or if these effects are otherwise controlled. 
The goal of this chapter is to compare the levels of trade barriers of 
different countries at the same point in  time, using trade data as cir- 
cumstantial evidence. The basic measure of  openness is the trade in- 
tensity ratio: exports plus imports divided by GNP. Data on the supplies 
of productive resources are used to remove the component of variability 
of  the trade  intensity  ratio associated with observable variability in 
resource supplies. Data on distance to markets are used to remove the 
component of  variability of the trade intensity  ratio associated with 
natural barriers. No attempt is made to supplement these data formally 
with direct measures of trade barriers such as tariff levels or indicators 
of nontariff barriers, but the results are assessed to some extent ac- 
cording to how well they reveal the best-known trade barriers. 
Import penetration ratios, especially their variability over time, have 
previously been used to suggest the levels of trade barriers by many 
authors, including, for example, Balassa and  Balassa (1984). In one 
sense, this chapter is an extension of  Saxonhouse’s (1983) comment 
that Japan’s low  ratio of imports to consumption  in manufactures is 
not due to high protection, but rather to resources suited to manufac- 
turing. 
In this chapter I have taken the approach of finding a model that pro- 
vides an adequate, even convincing, explanation of trade at the three- 
digit SITC (Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 2) level 
of  disaggregation, and then attributing the estimated residuals of  the 
model to the trade barriers. Implicitly, trade barriers are assumed to be 
(a)  the only important omitted variables and (b)  uncorrelated with the 
included variables. Both of these assumptions are suspicious. 
The assumption that the only omitted variables are trade barriers is 
doubtful. There is of  course no formal way to verify this hypothesis. 
Here I study the patterns of residuals in the hopes that peculiar residuals 
will suggest important omitted variables. When the model can no longer 
be criticized for failing to account for significant features of the data, 
1 proceed as if  all the remaining variability were attributable to trade 
barriers. Of  course it is a matter of art, not science, when I conclude 
that there are no further meaningful criticisms. 
The assumption that the barriers are uncorrelated with the included 
variables is clearly violated, possibly in a serious way. The included 
variables  are resources that can otherwise account for trade, and  if 
countries  that  are  similar in  their  resources  adopt  similar levels of 
barriers, the resource variables in the model will  soak up some of the 149  Measures of Openness 
effect of the barriers. One might hope that the structure of protection 
is uncorrelated with the resource variables, but Godek (1986) finds in 
a sample of fifteen developed countries that the overall level of tariffs 
in  1974 declined with per capita GNP. The best that can be said is that 
the measures of openness in this paper account only for those barriers 
that are uncorrelated with other variables in the model, in  particular, 
uncorrelated with the stage of  development. 
Though these criticisms are serious, they need to be considered in 
the proper context. The question is not whether a particular method 
produces perfect measures of openness, since none will. The real ques- 
tion is which method seems likely to produce the best measures. The 
alternatives to the measures reported here are either unadjusted trade 
intensity ratios or averages of directly measured barriers. Measures of 
openness that use trade intensity ratios without any adjustments can 
conclude that countries with unusual supplies of resources are the most 
open, merely because these countries have the highest levels of trade 
in the absence of any barriers at all. Tariff averages seem like appealing 
indicators of openness, but these averages make the implicit assumption 
that import elasticities are the same on all commodities. More impor- 
tantly,  tariffs are no longer very  high  in  comparison with  the  tariff 
equivalent of  many nontariff barriers. Tariff averages accordingly tell 
only part  of  the  story,  and  to be  very  meaningful they  need  to be 
combined  with measures  of  the restrictiveness of  nontariff barriers. 
But the tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers can be difficult to com- 
pute, especially for the many nontransparent barriers such as admin- 
istrative paper work, threats of tariffs, health regulations, and so forth. 
The approach I  use here employs the trade data implicitly to deter- 
mine the relative restrictiveness of barriers, which seems essential, but 
the attribution of the total unexplained component to trade barriers is 
suspicious for the  two reasons discussed  above. A better  approach 
might  be  to include measures of  tariff and  nontariff  barriers  in  the 
equation, and to measure their restrictiveness in terms of their contri- 
butions to the determination of trade. This seems simple enough, but 
the data problems and the model construction problems are formidable. 
At  the outset my modest hope is that I  can do better than merely use 
trade intensity ratios as measures of openness. 
Section  6.1 of  this  chapter contains a simple general  equilibrium 
model that serves as a backdrop for the data analysis. This model does 
indicate that, in the absence of trade barriers, the trade intensity ratio 
is  a  measure  of  the  peculiarity  of  the  resource  supply  vector.  But 
barriers to trade that raise the internal prices of commodities have very 
complex effects on the trade intensity ratio, and there seems to be no 
guarantee that the trade intensity ratio declines with increases in tariff 
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The model outlined in section 6.1 suggests a very complicated data 
analysis with variables measured subject to multiplicative measurement 
errors. For computational ease, I opt instead for the traditional linear 
regression model as an adequate approximation. 
Measures of openness and measures of peculiarity are discussed in 
section 6.3. The openness measures are (1) the ratio of actual to pre- 
dicted trade and  (2) an adjusted trade intensity  ratio that allows for 
differences in  resource supplies. One measure of  peculiarity is an R2 
that compares the size of  the residuals with the size of  the observed 
trade variances. Another measure of peculiarity is the size of residuals 
relative to other residuals. 
Estimates of  a factor-analytic model with the resources treated as 
unobserved variables are reported in section 6.4. These estimates are 
computed using a  1982 data set on trade of  183 commodities at the 
three-digit SITC level of aggregation. This factor-analytic model stands 
up relatively well to criticism, but its measures of openness are sus- 
picious since the factor-analytic method seems likely to remove most 
of the effects of barriers. 
Results based on a model with measured  values for the resources 
are reported in section 6.5. This estimated model does not survive as 
well  the criticism that there are important omitted variables, and its 
openness measures  have also to be viewed with suspicion. This sus- 
picion can probably only be relieved by combining the trade and re- 
source data with direct measures of trade barriers. 
6.1  A Theoretical Model 
The difference between the “predicted” and the actual trade inten- 
sity ratios will  be used as an indicator of  the level of  trade barriers. 
Obviously, a carefully formulated model is needed both to determine 
the conditions under which trade intensity ratios can serve as indicators 
of trade barriers and also to determine the nature of the adjustments 
to the trade intensity ratios that are needed to account for determinants 
of  trade other than barriers. A particularly  convenient model of the 
determinants of production and trade is the traditional general equilib- 
rium model with identical homothetic tastes, constant returns to scale, 
equal numbers of goods and factors, and with sufficient similarities in 
factor endowments that countries are all in the same cone of  diversi- 
fication. No real commitment is made to this model; it is only a useful 
starting point for thinking about the problems. 
6.1.1 
duction side of the model can be summarized by the system of equations: 
The Trade Intensity Ratio without Trade Barriers 
Assume initially that there are no barriers to trade. Then the pro- 151  Measures of Openness 
(1)  Q = A-' V, 
P,  (2) 
(3)  A = A(w,t), 
where Q is the vector of outputs, V is the vector of factor supplies, A 
is the input-output matrix with fixed elements equal to the amount of 
a factor used to produce a unit of a good, p is the vector of (internal) 
commodity prices, and w is the vector of factor returns. Equation (l), 
which translates factor supplies V into outputs Q, is the inverted form 
of the factor market equilibrium condition equating the supply of factors 
V to the demand for factors AQ. Equation (2), which translates product 
prices into factor prices, is the inverted form of the zero-profit condition 
equating product prices p to production costs A'w. Equation (3) ex- 
presses the dependence of input intensities on factor prices w and on 
the state of  technology t, A(w,r) being the cost-minimizing choice of 
input intensities at time t. 
In the absence of  barriers  to trade, all individuals face the  same 
commodity prices, and if  they have identical homothetic tastes, then 
they consume in the same proportions: 
(4)  C = sC,  = s  A-IV,, 
where C is the consumption vector, C,  is the world consumption vector, 
V,  is the vector of world resource supplies, and s is the consumption 
share. Thus trade is 
w  = AI-1 
(5)  T = Q - C = A-' V - s A-' V,  = A-' (V -  s V,). 
The trade balance  condition  IT'T = 0, with  IT  the vector  of  prices, 
implies that the consumption share is the ratio of GNP to world GNP: 
(6)  s = IT'A-'  V/d A-' V,  = GNP/GNP,  . 
Using this value for the consumption share and dividing equation (5) 
by GNP, we obtain 
T/GNP = A-' ([VIGNP] - [V,/GNP,]). 
Finally,  premultiplying by  II, a diagonal matrix with prices down the 
diagonal, and using W, a diagonal matrix with wages down the diagonal, 
we find the trade vector in value terms: 
IIT/GNP = IIA-'W-' ([WVIGNP] - [WV,/GNP,]) 
= 0 ([WVIGNP] - [WV,/GNP,]) 
= 0  (A - A,), 
where 0 is the inverse of  the matrix of  input shares, and 
A  = WVIGNP is the vector of earnings shares. 152  Edward E. Learner 
The trade intensity ratio (TZR) thus becomes a measure of the dif- 
ference between  the vector of earnings  shares of  the world  and the 
vector of earnings shares of the country: 
(7)  TIR = In  T/GNPI = 10  (A -  A,,.)[, 
where IT1  indicates the sum of absolute values of the elements of  T, 
and n is a diagonal matrix with prices on the diagonal. Thus in  this 
model with no differences in technologies or tastes, and no trade bar- 
riers, the trade intensity ratio is a measure of resource distinctiveness. 
The more unusual is the country's vector of earnings shares, the greater 
is the trade intensity ratio. 
Other Assumptions 
This model is based on a long list of  suspicious assumptions; con- 
sequently there is great concern that some minor changes in the model 
would imply that the trade intensity ratio is not an indicator of resource 
peculiarity. Four that come to mind are nontraded goods, intermediate 
goods, nonproportional consumption, and trade imbalance. The trade 
intensity ratio might be expected to be high for countries with small 
nontraded goods sectors, for countries that import great amounts of 
intermediate inputs, for countries that consume large proportions of 
certain goods,  and  for  countries  that  have  large  trade  imbalances. 
Actually, as is  shown  in  Learner  (1984), the  model  summarized  by 
equation (5)  remains basically intact if  it includes some forms of non- 
traded goods, intermediate inputs, and nonproportional consumption. 
Trade  imbalance, alone, and  nonproportional consumption  together 
with  nontraded goods alter the model  in such a way  that  the trade 
intensity ratio is not a good indicator of resource peculiarity. What is 
essential for the empirical work in  this chapter, however, is not that 
the trade intensity ratio is an indicator of resource peculiarity, but that 
the trade equations are linear in resources. The residuals can then be 
attributed to trade barriers. 
Nontraded goods and intermediate inputs are discussed  separately 
in  Learner  (1984,  23  and  33).  Consider here  the  possibility of  both 
intermediate  inputs  and  nontraded  goods.  Let  Q, and  Q,, stand for 
vectors of final outputs of  traded and nontraded goods respectively. 
Let the intermediate inputs required to produce X be BX, leaving as 
final output  Q = (I - B)X where  B depends on factor  prices  and 
technology, B(w,t). The condition for equilibrium in the factor markets 
is  A,X,  + A,X,  = V. Substituting into this  equation the  condition 
X  = (I - B)-'Q = DQ, we  can solve for final output of  the traded 
goods as a function of  final output of nontraded goods, EQ, = V - 
FQ,,, where E = A,D,,  + A,,D,,,,  and F = A,D,,  + A,D,,.  Further- 
more, assume identical homothetic tastes to obtain C,  = sQ,,,.,  and 153  Measures of Openness 
C,, = sQ,,,,,, where the w subscript refers to world totals and s is the 
consumption  share. Then the trade equations analogous to equation 
(5)  are 
ET = EQ, - EC, = EQ, - SEQ,,,. = V - FQ, - s(V,  - FQ,,,,) 
= V - sFQ,,,  - s(V," - FQ,,)  = V - sV, . 
Thus all that changes when intermediate inputs and nontraded goods 
are included in the model is that E replaces A in equation (5). 
Learner  (1984, 39-40)  shows that essentially  the same conclusion 
applies if consumption is income-dependent: trade depends linearly on 
excess factor supplies. But  it  is not  possible  to have  both  income- 
dependent consumption  and  nontraded goods since, for example, a 
preference for nontraded goods at low levels of  income would imply 
that the trade intensity ratio would increase in response to a propor- 
tional increase in the supply of  all resources. 
Trade imbalance will also affect the trade intensity ratio. Let B be 
the trade  surplus,  B  = IT'T,  and  b = B/GNP. Then  the  net  export 
vector relative to GNP can be written as 
IITIGNP = 0  (A -  A,,,)  + b 0  A,,,. 
The trade intensity ratio then becomes a function of the trade balance 
b and attains a minimum in general at some value of balance other than 
zero. 
6.  I .2  The Trade Intensity Ratio with Trade Barriers 
Trade barriers are another major determinant of trade intensity ra- 
tios. To  model  the effects of  trade  barriers  it is necessary  to make 
assumptions about the elasticities of supply and demand. A convenient 
way  to do that  is to use  Cobb-Douglas  utility functions and Cobb- 
Douglas production functions. On the consumption side, this amounts 
to the statement that the budget shares are fixed parameters: 
(8)  p, C,  = a<.  Y, 
where  C, is consumption  of  commodity  c,  pc is  the  internal  (tariff 
inclusive) price,  a,  is the fixed expenditure share, and  Y is total ex- 
penditure.  In  words, the  value of  consumption is equal to the con- 
sumption share times total expenditure. Then using the identity that 
trade is the difference between production and consumption, we can 
solve for the trade equations as 
T = A-1 V - p-'  a Y, 
where P is a diagonal matrix with internal prices on the diagonal. 
For purposes of discussion, let us proceed as if all barriers amount 
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rate. These taxes will conveniently be called “tariffs,”  though they can 
represent a wider set of trade impediments.  The level of a tariff on 
commodity c will be denoted by T( and the corresponding external price 
by  nTT,. Then the internal price of the commodity is’ 
p, =  nc  ( 1 + 70. 
Premultiplying the trade vector by the external prices n  and imposing 
the trade balance condition 0 = dT,  we can calculate the expenditure 
levek2 
(9)  Y = (n’A -IV)/(nrP-’  a) = GNP (1 + T.), 
where GNP is the value of output at world prices dA-’V,  and 7. is 
an index of trade barriers overall: 
(10)  (1  + 7.) = (2  a,  /(1  -k  Tc))-’. 
Incidentally, the summation in this expression extends over all com- 
modities, including export items. For example, if  tariffs are uniformly 
set to T for all import commodities, then (1  + 7.) = (1 + T)/(Y, where 
a,,,  is the share of imports in consumption. 
Cobb-Douglas (log-linear) production functions and cost minimiza- 
tion imply fixed factor shares: Oh  = wfAfc/p,  where OfC is a techno- 
logically fixed parameter, w is the factor return, p is the product price, 
and A is the input-output ratio. In matrix form this becomes 
0 = WAP-’, 
where 0 is a matrix of technologically  fixed factor shares and where 
notation  indicating the dependence of all of the variables on time is 
suppressed. Substituting this into equation (1)  yields the production 
relationships 
@PQ=WV. 
In words, the product of the value of output PQ times the input share 
0 is equal to the value of the input WV. 
The Stolper-Samuelson  mapping  of  commodity prices  into factor 
prices given this Cobb-Douglas technology can be found by substituting 
the cost minimization condition for selecting the amount of input fin 
commodity c, Vh  = Ofc/wf,  into the unit value isoquants in logarithmic 
form 
0 = In(p,) + In  (a,)  + XffcfIn(V,,)  , c =  1, 2 . . . 
to obtain the system 
(1 1)  @’ln(w)  = In(p) + In(k), 155  Measures of Openness 
where h(w) is a vector of logarithms of factor returns, h(p) is a vector 
of logarithms of prices, and h(k) is a vector of constants. In a more 
direct notation, the return to factorfas a function of the product prices 
can be written as 
Wf  = rI (kcpc)ty 
c 
where Wis  the (c,f) element of the inverse of 0. 
Under these assumptions the trade vector satisfies 
(12)  PT = @-I  W V -  01  Y = 0-'  W V -  01  GNP (I + T.), 
where the internal factor prices W are functions of the product prices 
according to the log-linear relationship (1  1).  In words, the net export 
vector evaluated at internal prices is a function of factor supplies eval- 
uated at internal prices and the product of GNP times an index of trade 
barriers. 
Estimates of  GNP will  usually evaluate output at  internal  prices. 
This level of nominal GNP will be denoted by 
GNP* = p'P-1 0-1 WV  = 1'0-1 WV  = 1' WV. 
Some of the trade flows are evaluated at external prices and some at 
internal prices. Trade data collected on an f.0.b. basis would exclude 
tariff receipts and transportation charges, but would include the effects 
of various nontariff barriers  such as voluntary export restraints and 
quotas administered by the exporting country. Nonetheless, it is prob- 
ably a good approximation to assume that the trade flows are evaluated 
at external prices. The trade intensity ratio accordingly becomes 
(13)  TZR  = In  T/GNP'I 
= (lIP-'  [@-I  A -  01  (1  + 7.)  (GNf'/GNP*)II 
= 1(1  + T)-~  [@-I  A - a  (1  + 7.) (GNZ'/GNP*)]I, 
where  A  is the vector of  earnings shares and (1 + T)  is a diagonal 
matrix with one plus the tariff rate on the diagonal. 
From equations (12) and (13) it is clear that the assumptions of con- 
stant expenditure shares and constant input shares limit the effects that 
trade barriers can have if inputs and outputs are evaluated at internal 
prices. In fact the principal influence of barriers is to alter the internal 
rewards to factors and the internal valuation of commodities. If com- 
modities and factors are evaluated at internal prices, barriers have their 
only other effect through the term (1  + T.)(GNP/GNP*). 
In the absence of trade  barriers,  the trade  intensity  ratio (7) is a 
measure of  the difference  in  earning  shares of  the country  and the 
world as a whole. Trade barriers obviously have an influence on the 156  Edward E. Learner 
trade intensity  ratio, as is apparent from equation (13). The precise 
effect is however not so transparent. When the trade intensity ratio is 
used as an indicator of trade barriers, an implicit assumption is made 
that the ordering of countries by trade intensity replicates the ordering 
of countries by trade barriers, other things like resources held constant. 
We  need now to inspect equation (13) to determine if this inference is 
legitimate. One restriction that we might expect equation (13) to satisfy 
is that the derivative of  the trade intensity  ratio with respect to any 
single barrier is negative. This restriction is not a necessary property 
of equation (13), which is not surprising since complementarities among 
products  could  easily  lead  to greater  trade  intensity  overall  as the 
barrier is raised on a single product. A weaker restriction on the func- 
tion (13) is that proportional increases in all barriers on imports would 
necessarily  lower  the  trade  intensity  ratio.  Instinctively,  one might 
appeal to Hicks's theorem on composite commodities, but in this case 
raising the level of tariffs overall may  switch commodities from the 
import group to the export group, thereby altering the relative prices 
within the original classes of products. Accordingly, there appears to 
be no guarantee that this trade intensity ratio decreases as tariffs overall 
increase. Without this minimal property, the trade intensity ratio is a 
suspicious indicator of the level of trade barriers, even for otherwise 
identical countries. 
6.  I .3  Estimation Issues 
Another reason for running this model through its paces is to make 
decisions about the kind of data analysis that is likely to be most fruitful. 
Our goal  is to use  a cross-country  data set on resources  and trade 
values to infer trade barriers. To  do this we must assume that trade, 
resources, and barriers satisfy a set of relationships like that in equation 
(12).  In addition, we must assume that the taste and technology pa- 
rameters are fixed across countries, and that the trade barriers are like 
random draws from some probability distribution. Then we can esti- 
mate the taste and technology parameters from the cross-country data 
set and attribute the unexplained variability of trade to the trade barriers. 
This program is not easily carried out because of the complexity of 
the restrictions that trade, resources, and trade barriers are likely to 
satisfy. A typical equation from the system (12) is 
TijTij = (2,  [ajf Wif VifIWwfI  + 2,  "Yjf Vif  (1  + T.i)IY(l  Tij)i 
where TJ, is the value of net exports of commodity j  by country  i, 
T~~ is the tariff barrier on commodity j  in country  i, wi,f  is the internal 
reward to factorfin country  i,  V,  is the supply of factorfin country 
i, -ii. is  the  tariff average, and  tijf  and  yjf are taste and  technology 157  Measures of  Openness 
parameters. To make clear what is observable and what is unobservable 
in this relationship, we can rewrite it as 
(14) 
where yij, xjj, and zji are unobservables for which there exist the fol- 
lowing proxy variables: 
yij = Xf  Sf  Xjf + Ef  yf Zif , 
n..T..  = y..(l + T..)  (15)  JJI.1  IJ  IJ  ’ 
V,, = X~~(W,,.~/W~~),  and 
Vjf = Zif(1 + Ti), 
where the terms on the left are observable, and the terms in parentheses 
are associated with the structure of  barriers and are treated as unob- 
servables coming from some suitably selected distribution. The goal 
would be to use observations on the value of trade and on the supply 
of resources to infer the unobservable variables reflecting the barriers: 
(1 + T~,), (wwf/wif),  and (1  + T.~).  This could be  called an errors-in- 
variable model with multiplicative measurement errors. The usual ad- 
ditive measurement error model consists of a linear relationship among 
true variables x: p‘xi = 0, together with an additive measurement error 
process xi = xi + E;  where x is  the measured  variable and  E  is the 
measurement error. The model suggested by equation (12) has a linear 
relationship among the true variables, but a multiplicative measurement 
process: log(xi) = log(xi) + log(Ei). This multiplicative error model is 
of great interest but it presents formidable estimation problems. A linear 
approximation  (dxy  = xdy  + ydx) to the measurement error process 
allows a tractable treatment of  the problem: 
(16)  nijTij = yij(1 + T,)  + Yj(~ij  -  T,), 
V, = xif’ + Ta(wWf/wv - I), and 
-  vif’  = Z$(l  + 7.) + zf(T.i-  T.), 
where the bar over the figure denotes the average across countries. 
Also for tractability, it is assumed that the cross-country variance of 
T~~ is so much greater than the variances of  (W,,~/W$)  and  that the 
latter may  be  treated as constants. In words, it is assumed that the 
cross-commodity structure of barriers varies much more than average 
barriers. This allows us to take the level of  trade as a “dependent” 
variable and to ignore the “reverse”  regression solutions to the usual 
errors-in-variables models that would have to be studied if the other 
variables were also measured with error. The model then becomes 158  Edward E. Learner 
where eij is attributable to the trade barriers and represents the effect 
of the difference between this country’s tariff structure and the typical 
or average tariff structure eri = yj(~ii  -  Tj). 
After the model is estimated, we may set the estimated residuals to 
zero to determine the effects of  the trade barriers. It is important to 
understand  that this corrects for trade barriers only in  the sense of 
equalizing the levels of  the barriers for all  countries at roughly the 
existing cross-country average. 
6.2  Trade Intensity Ratios and Intra-Industry Trade Ratios 
Trade intensity ratios and intra-industry  trade indicators based  on 
the  1982 data set are reported in  table 6.1. Commodities have been 
divided as in Learner (1984) into three subgroups: (R) resource trade: 
Table 6.1  Trade Intensity Ratios and Intra-Industry Trade Ratios, 1982 
Country 
Trade Intensity  Intra-Industry Trade 
RAM0  R  AM0 
Low-income economies 
Pakistan  .04 
Bangladesh  .02 
Ethiopia  .04 
Sri Lanka  .I2 
French Guiana  .28 
Lower-middle-income economies 
Colombia  .01 
Dominican RP  .05 
Turkey  .07 
Philippines  .07 
Peru  .09 
El  Salvador  .06 
Cameroon  .07 
Ecuador  .I1 
Egypt  .06 
Thailand  .09 
Nicaragua  .06 
Indonesia  .22 
Morocco  .I3 
Ivory Coast  .08 
Costa Rica  .08 
Upper-middle-income economies 
Brazil  .05 
Argentina  .02 
Yugoslavia  .06 

























































































































.I8  .I7 
.I0  .08 
.01  .04 
.I0  .I3 
.06  .24 
.21  .I9 
.22  .I0 
.29  .I8 
.70  .37 
.I2  .I0 
.44  .25 
.I1  .08 
.03  .02 
.05  .I0 
.48  .24 
.11  .09 
.06  .14 
.I5  .09 
.42  .22 
.88  .34 
.93  .31 
.74  .28 
1.37  .84 
.41  .28 Table 6.1  (continued) 
Country 
Trade Intensity  Intra-Industry Trade 
RAM  0  R  AM0 
Israel  .08  .07  .I9 
Panama  .II  .08  .22 
Trinidad and Tobago  .24  .07  .28 
Hong Kong  .07  .I0  .45 
Malaysia  .I8  .23  .23 
Jordan  .22  .I4  .37 
Singapore  .80  .I3  .68 
United Arab Emirates  .02  .03  .22 
Oman  .04  .06  .25 
Saudi Arabia  .50  .04  .21 
Portugal  .11  .I1  .20 
High-income oil exporters 
Industrial market economies 
U.S.A.  .02  .01  .03 
United Kingdom  .02  .03  .05 
France  .05  .02  .04 
Spain  .07  .03  .06 
Austria  .05  .04  .08 
Canada  .04  .06  .07 
Japan  .07  .02  .I1 
Germany FR  .05  .02  .12 
Australia  .05  .05  .09 
Sweden  .06  .06  .I0 
Italy  .07  .04  .II 
Switzerland  .03  .03  .I7 
Denmark  .06  .10  .09 
Finland  .07  .I2  .12 
Norway  .I7  .04  .I3 
Netherlands  .I5  .I0  .10 
Belgium  .I2  .06  .19 
New Zealand  .05  .I7  .I5 
Ireland  .09  .I7  .21 
Hungary  .01  .02  .02 
East European nonmarket economies 
Other 
Bermuda  .06  .I0  .23 
Fiji  .08  .I9  .14 
French Polynesia  .06  .I0  .25 
Martinique  .08  .I4  .28 
Guadeloupe  .06  .I8  .30 
New Caledonia  .I7  .08  .30 
Cyprus  .I0  .I5  .31 
Iceland  .09  .26  .24 
Tonga  .08  .27  .25 













































































.  00 
.  00 
.34 
.03 
-  0.00 
.  00 
.23  .97  .58 
.24  .06  .I0 
.22  .65  .40 
.18  .I6  31 
.86  1.64  1.35 
.I5  .80  .45 
.53  .43  .33 
2.37  1.67  1.08 
.38  .24  .25 
.I2  .31  .24 
.04  .04  .01 
,523  1.44  .92 
.71  3.53  2.36 
1.34  4.40  1.98 
.44  1.40  .70 
.78  3.37  1.84 
.37  2.24  1.25 
.I6  .33  .21 
1.24  1.70  1.34 
.I5  .38  .28 
.32  2.47  1.37 
.47  1.48  .94 
.54  1.52  1.19 
.63  2.18  1.11 
.13  1.43  .67 
.43  1.19  .70 
1.21  3.46  1.61 
2.22  3.28  2.39 
.16  .47  .26 
.53  2.27  1.21 
.I7  1.75  .67 
.OO  .17  .I0 
.I8  .66  .53 
.01  .07  .05 
.24  .08  .I6 
.I3  .05  .07 
.05  .03  .02 
.43  .36  .37 
.04  .II  .07 
.02  .II  .05 
.05  .I1  .02 
Notes: Trade intensity  = ZIX-  MIIGNP; intra-industry trade = [X((A  +  (MI)ElX- MI] -  I. 
Sorted by overall trade intensity. R = resources; A = agriculture; M  = manufacturing; 
0 = overall. 160  Edward E.  Learner 
SITC 27, 28, 32-35,  68; (A) agricultural trade: SITC 1-26,  29,41-43, 
63, 64, 94; and (M) manufactured trade: SITC 51 -96  except 63,64,68, 
94. See Learner (1978, chapter 3) for a full description of  these SITC 
categories. Countries have  been  sorted first according to the World 
Bank classification in the World Development Report and second by 
the overall measure of trade intensity. Table 6.2 contains ranks of the 
trade intensity ratios reported in table 6.1. 
The overall trade intensity ratio varies from 6 percent of  GNP for 
Hungary  to  108  percent  of  GNP for Singapore. The  upper-middle- 
income economies and the lower-middle-income economies have gen- 
erally more intense trade than the industrial market economies. Among 
the  industrial  market economies, the  United  States and  the  United 
Kingdom engage in little trade, whereas Belgium, New Zealand, and 
Ireland have a great deal of trade. 
Generally, the trade intensities of  resource, agricultural, and man- 
ufacturing trade are comparable. Some exceptions apparent in table 
6.2 are those countries that have one group with a much higher rank 
than the other two: Ethiopia, Colombia, and Argentina with relatively 
intense trade in agricultural products; Spain in resources; Switzerland 
and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)  in manufactures. Some other 
exceptions are Japan, especially, and Germany F.R. with little agri- 
cultural trade. Features like these are suggestive of trade barriers, but 
Table 6.2  Ranks of Trade Intensity Ratios, 1982 (ZlX -  MIIGNP) 






































































































55 Table 6.2  (continued) 














High-income oil exporters 



















Be  I g  i u m 
New Zealand 
Ireland 



































East European nonmarket economies 
Other 
Hungary  2 
Bermuda  21 
Fiji  39 
French Polynesia  25 
Martinique  37 
Guadeloupe  27 
New Caledonia  56 
Cyprus  48 
Iceland  45 
Tonga  40 








































































































































Notes:  Sorted  by  overall  trade  dependence.  R = resources;  A  = agriculture; 
M = manufacturing; 0 = overall. 162  Edward E. Learner 
the question that we attempt to answer is whether these distinctive 
trade patterns can be accounted for by peculiarities in resource supplies. 
The trade data used in this study are collected at the three-digit SITC 
level of disaggregation. The measure of trade intensity reported in table 
6.1 nets imports from exports at this level of disaggregation: 
TIR = 2,  I Xj - Mj I/GNP, 
where the summation is over the set of commodity classes. At the very 
lowest level of aggregation, we might expect commodities to be either 
exported or imported, but not  both. But at the level of aggregation 
that we use, there is a substantial amount of “two-way”  trade. If  the 
linear trade model summarized by equation  (I 2) is used as a guide, this 
netting out of imports from exports is an irrelevant issue of aggregation, 
since the trade vector can be aggregated without affecting the linearity 
of the model or the conclusion that the trade intensity ratio is under 
certain circumstances a measure of resource peculiarity. The only con- 
cern is that the trade intensity ratio (13) is a somewhat different measure 
of peculiarity of resource supplies at each level of aggregation. The 
one exception to this statement would be if the aggregation were carried 
to the extreme of a single commodity. Then the trade intensity ratio 
becomes only the ratio of the overall trade surplus to GNP. 
The more traditional measure of trade intensity does not net imports 
from exports: 
TIR* = Cj  (I  X, I  +  1  Mj I)/GNP. 
These two measures, TIR and TIR*, would be identical if  the disag- 
gregation were fine enough that commodities were either exported or 
imported, but not both. A measure of the difference between these two 
trade intensity indicators is the intra-industry trade measure also re- 
ported in table 6.1 : 
ZIT  = [Cj(l Xj  I  +  1  M, 1)Ej I Xj - Mj I ] - 1 
= (TIR*/TIR) - 1. 
This IIT measure would be zero if  there were no intra-industry trade 
at this level of disaggregation. A  value of one indicates the TIR* is 
twice as large as TIR, which is a major discrepancy. Most of the large 
numbers for this measure of intra-industry trade occur in manufactures, 
and, partly for that reason, the measures are generally greatest for the 
industrial market economies with trade relatively concentrated in man- 
ufactures. In particular,  Belgium and the United Kingdom have large 
amounts of intra-industry trade. Saudi Arabia, Brunei, New Caledonia, 
and Ecuador have hardly any. 
There are some exceptions to the general rule that the IIT is greatest 
for the industrial market economies and for manufactures. Singapore 163  Measures of  Openness 
and Hong Kong stand out among the nonindustrial market economies 
with much intra-industry  trade. Japan, New Zealand, and Australia, 
though classified as “industrial market economies,” have rather low 
levels of  IIT. Some other exceptions are the large values of  IIT of 
resource trade for Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, Belgium 
and Fiji, and agricultural trade for Singapore, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium. 
These measures of  intra-industry trade are reported in  table 6.1 to 
suggest a potential defect in the model that is used as a foundation for 
forming measures of  openness. This model uses the assumption of 
constant returns to scale and does not allow for intra-industry trade 
except as a consequence entirely of aggregation. One may interpret 
the IIT numbers in table 6.1 as suggesting that the level of aggregation 
is “higher”  in the manufactures categories, or one may conclude that 
increasing returns to scale or some other phenomenon is a more sig- 
nificant determinant of  trade in manufactures than resources or agri- 
culture. If it is the former, the data analysis now to be discussed proceeds 
intact. If it is the latter, the data analysis becomes suspect. This issue 
will arise again when we inspect the residuals, which may also suggest 
economies of scale or determinants of trade not otherwise accounted 
for. 
6.3  Measures of Openness, Interventions, and Peculiarity 
Obviously, trade barriers account for only a small fraction of the 
variability of the trade intensity ratios. To form sensible measures of 
openness it is necessary to control for the other major determinants 
of trade intensity. The model of trade outlined  previously can serve 
as a foundation for controlling for variability in resource supplies and 
other influences. Let N, be the value of net exports and N*, = pj’V, 
be the corresponding number  “predicted”  by  the model where V is 
the vector of resource supplies and p is a vector of  parameters de- 
pending on tastes, technologies, and prices. The difference between 
the actual net trade and the predicted net trade will be indicated by 
Ejj =  Njj - N*,,  which  optimistically  reflects  the  impact  of  trade 
barriers on trade. 
The measure of openness suggested here is the difference between 
the actual trade intensity ratio and the trade intensity ratio predicted 
by the model. A country is said to be “open”  if its trade is unusually 
great compared with  the predictions of  the model.  This measure of 
openness may either increase or decrease as the residuals Ejj  increase. 
Measures of the absolute size of the residuals are also of  interest for 
two reasons.  Residuals that are large in  absolute value can  suggest 164  Edward E.  Learner 
omitted variables, or they can suggest policy interventions that affect 
trade either negatively or positively. 
6.3.1  Measures of Openness 
intensity ratio 
The measure of openness used in this chapter is the adjusted trade 
TIRAl  = G,  I N,,  I - x,  IN*, IYGNP, , 
where W  is  the  trade  predicted  by  the  model.  This  adjusted  trade 
intensity ratio is the actual trade intensity ratio minus the trade intensity 
ratio predicted by the model. The country-size effect is eliminated here 
by  dividing by GNP. 
An alternative measure of openness is the ratio of  actual trade to 
predicted trade: 
0, = E, I N,, IP,  I  N*,, I. 
Note that these two measures are related by the expression 
TIRA = (0 - I) TIR*, 
where TIR* is the predicted trade intensity ratio. These two measures 
will differ for countries with greatly different levels of predicted trade 
intensity. The choice between these two measures is not entirely clear- 
cut. The ratio of actual to adjusted trade is analogous to a tariff average 
that suggests how  much  trade is deterred by  barriers. The adjusted 
trade intensity ratio is analogous to a measure of welfare loss indicating 
the percentage of GNP lost as a result of  trade barriers. The decision 
here to use the adjusted trade intensity ratio reflects primarily that our 
starting point is the trade intensity ratio. Regardless, this discussion 
usefully emphasizes that there are two different openness concepts. It 
bears repeating that the adjusted trade intensities studied here should 
not be expected to give the same ranking of countries when countries 
have very different levels of trade intensity. 
6.3.2  Measures of  Peculiarity 
The size of  the residuals El, = N,, - N*,,  can be used to measure 
the peculiarity of  trade of country i or commodity j.  The traditional 
measures of the quality of the model in explaining the variability of the 
data are country and commodity R2's.  A country RZ  can be defined in 
the usual way as 
Rf =  1 - [C,E,,Zl/[C,(N,, - N,)'], 
where Nl = E, N,/J  is the average trade of  country  i.  If trade were 
balanced, then  the  mean  would  be  zero and the  country R2 would 
measure the size of the squared residuals relative to the size of squared 165  Measures of Openness 
net trade. This R2  need not be a positive number. The model is estimated 
across countries for each commodity, and a commodity R2 is  neces- 
sarily between zero and one for the usual reasons.  But it is possible 
for trade of  a country to be  so poorly explained for each commodity 
that the country R2  is negative. 
We  will also need measures of  peculiarity of  specific observations. 
A measure of the peculiarity of commodity j in country  i is its contri- 
bution to the total lack of  fit for that country: 
P;j = Ejj/Cj  I  E;,j  1. 
This measure uses the absolute residual rather than the squared residual 
to reduce the effect of extreme values and also to make the measure 
more comparable with the adjusted trade dependence ratio, which uses 
absolute values of  trade. Summing across countries produces an in- 
dicator of the overall peculiarity of commodity j: 
Pj  = c;  I  Pjj  I. 
Generally, these measures will  be large for commodities that are im- 
portant in total trade and that are poorly explained by the model. These 
numbers differ from RZ’s  in using absolute, not squared, residuals and 
also in emphasizing those commodities that are important in total trade. 
These measures of  peculiarity are intended to stimulate a criticism 
of the model. There are a variety of reasons net exports might be judged 
peculiar when the linear Heckscher-Ohlin  model is used as a guide. 
One possibility is the presence of  nonlinearities in  the data set. The- 
oretically, nonlinearities are associated with the failure of one or more 
assumptions on which the model is based. Two especially suspicious 
assumptions are incomplete specialization and constant returns to scale. 
Another reason for poor fits is the omission of  resources that have a 
substantial effect on the trade of at least a few countries. A third reason 
for a peculiar trade structure is unusually high or unusually low barriers 
to trade, either natural or artificial. The approach taken here is to form 
measures  of  peculiarity for countries and commodities  in the hopes 
that they will  stimulate successful criticisms of the model, such as the 
presence of  important nonlinearities, or omitted resources. When no 
further successful criticisms can be made, the residuals will be taken 
to be entirely a consequence of  the structure of trade barriers. 
6.3.3  Intervention Rates 
The presumption made in calling the adjusted trade intensity ratio a 
measure of openness is that most policies have the effect of deterring 
trade and that greater trade is therefore associated with less interven- 
tion. But many policies promote trade. An alternative concept is the 
rate of intervention that measures the extent to which trade is distorted 166  Edward E. Learner 
by policy, positively or negatively. Analogous to the two measures of 
openness, we  propose two measures of  the rate  of  intervention for 
country  i: 
Znt,,  = (Xj  I Eij I)lGNPi , and 
Zntzi = Xj  I Ei,j  llXj I N*,  I. 
A serious problem with these measures is that they take as a norm the 
average level of policy intervention, since a country with zero residuals 
is one with typical trade barriers, not with the absence of trade barriers. 
The data considered here include no information on actual policy in- 
terventions, and it is impossible to estimate the effect of eliminating 
the interventions that contaminate the data. Another comment is that 
these intervention rates are merely measures of the size of the residuals 
and might as well be called measures of peculiarity. The difference is 
only in the denominator. 
6.4  Measures of  Peculiarity and Openness using a Factor-Analytic 
Model 
Initially a promising approach is to treat the resources as unobserv- 
able parameters and to estimate them jointly with the tasteltechnology 
parameters. In the statistics literature the study of  this kind of model 
is called factor analysis. In this literature, one set of unobservables is 
usually treated as a set of fixed parameters and the other as a set of 
random variables. These random or “latent variables” are called fac- 
tors, which should not be confused with our other usage offactor  to 
refer to an input into a production process. Unlike the traditional ap- 
proach, both sets of unobservables will be treated as fixed  constant^.^ 
My  initial impression was that the factor-analytic approach would 
be useful for two reasons, but on further reflection the approach seems 
fundamentally flawed. I report these factor-analytic results nonetheless 
since they contrast in  an interesting way  with  the  results  from  the 
regression model, and since they identify commodities likely to cause 
great difficulties for the kind of study that attributes what is unexplained 
to trade barriers. 
In the factor-analytic approach, the resource endowments need not 
be at all measurable, which seems appealing. The unscaled and scaled 
models we have discussed are 
N, = Pj’Vi + ejj,  and 
NijlGNPi = (Pj’Vi + €ij)/GNPi  . 
In  the  regression  analysis  in  the  next  section, we  treat  the  taste/ 
technology parameters P as unobservables and the resources V as fully 167  Measures of Openness 
observable. The list of observable resources is rather brief, and there 
is a strong possibility that there are important omitted  variables. In 
addition, the assumption that resources such as capital, labor, and land 
could be measured without error is highly doubtful. A factor-analytic 
approach addresses both of  these problems by  treating the resources 
as unobservables that are estimated jointly with the taste/technology 
parameters by minimizing either the unscaled or scaled sum of squared 
residuals: 
min  Cij[Nij  - Pj’Vi]*,  and 
Pjy  Vi 
min  Cij[(Nij - Pj’Vj)/GNPi]*. 
Pj,Vi 
The fact that there is no need actually to measure the resources V 
seems to make the factor-analytic approach very appealing. But there 
is one minor problem and one major problem that together make the 
approach questionable. First, by ignoring altogether the measurements 
of resources, the method is necessarily inefficient in a statistical sense, 
though certainly more convenient than a treatment that deals properly 
with the errors in variables issues. 
This inefficiency seems minor compared with the more serious short- 
coming of the factor-analytic approach. Since only trade data are used 
to infer the existence of barriers, only peculiarities in the structure of 
trade in comparison with other countries can give rise to the conclusion 
that barriers are important.  Protection  schemes used by  a sufficient 
number  of  countries  in the  sample  will  go  undetected  because  the 
structure of trade of any of these countries would not seem abnormal. 
The point that many barriers will go undetected is evident from the 
theoretical model summarized by equations (14) and (15) which indicate 
that the variables in the trade equations are the resources valued at 
internal  (local) prices.  The factor-analytic estimation  would  impute 
values for the explanatory variables that would offer the best overall 
fits. Theoretically, these are resources evaluated at internal prices. The 
residual left over from the factor-analytic approach therefore does not 
include the effects that barriers have on internal factor rewards, or for 
that matter the overall tariff average T~. 
In models other than the one summarized in equations (14) and (13, 
the imputed factors can be expected also to partly reflect the trade 
barriers. One of  the imputed factors may just be the overall level of 
barriers, another may  be  the average  tariff level on labor-intensive 
manufactures, and so forth. The assumption necessary to preclude this 
undesirable outcome is that the effects of the barriers  behave like a 
set of independent random variables with a zero mean and a common 168  Edward E. Learner 
variance.  Among  many  other things,  this  implies that  there  are no 
“country  effects”  and  no  “commodity  effects”  in the  structure of 
protection, which seems doubtful. 
Of  course it is also necessary to make doubtful assumptions when 
doing the regression analysis with observed resources. In the spirit of 
this chapter, we cannot discard  the factor-analytic approach merely 
because the method is imperfect, since all methods share that property. 
The argument, instead, is that  the regression analysis is  superior to 
factor analysis because the measures of openness associated with the 
regression  method  are likely to be  indicative of  trade  barriers even 
when the assumptions fail, but the factor-analytic approach seems to 
produce residuals that are mostly unrelated to barriers. 
In the regression approach, the estimated residuals include the com- 
ponents  of  the  variability  of  (1)  trade  barriers and  (2) unmeasured 
resources that are uncorrelated with the measured resources. At least 
we  can  hope  that  trade  barriers  have  a substantial effect  on  these 
residuals, particularly  if the major resources are observed and  if  the 
effects of  barriers are substantial. This contrasts with the factor-analytic 
approach in which the residuals will reflect whatever variables do not 
have a general effect on the structure of  trade. These may  be partly 
the “random”  component of trade barriers, but are likely to be dom- 
inated by unusual resources that affect the trade of a few commodities 
in a few countries.  I  am thinking here of  the “specific factors”  that 
account for such things as the Swiss export of watches or the Austrian 
importation of automobiles. More on this below. 
Another issue that must be raised in the factor-analytic approach is 
how to choose the number of  factors. I adopt the asymptotic Bayes 
criterion of  Schwartz (1978) and Learner (1978): 
Criterion  = -  (p/2)fn(n)  - In(maximized likelihood) 
= -  (p/2)ln(n)  - (n/2)ln(ESS), 
where  n  is  the number of  observations,  ESS is the  residual  sum of 
squares, and p  is  the  number  of  parameters, which for this factor- 
analytic model is equal to the number of commodities times the number 
of latent factors. This criterion involves a specific form of penalty for 
the number of parameters and relates to the maximized likelihood func- 
tion as the adjusted R2 relates to the unadjusted R2.  This criterion is 
an asymptotic approximation to the logarithm of the marginal likelihood 
function from which the posterior odds ratio can be  calculated. The 
approximate posterior odds ratio of one model, H,,  in comparison with 
another, H2,  is formed by  exponentiating the criterion: 
Posterior Odds (HI  : H,) = exp [Criterion(H,) - Criterion(H2)] 
x  Prior Odds(H, : HJ. 169  Measures of Openness 
These posterior odds ratios can sometimes be very extreme when it 
seems intuitively unlikely that the data admit such sharp inferences. 
The extreme odds are a consequence of the assumptions that lead up 
to them, in this case especially the assumption of normality. Normality 
is always a doubtful assumption, and when it leads to incredible con- 
clusions from a data set, either the conclusions need to be “consumed 
with a grain of  salt”  or the data analysis needs to be redone with a 
wider class of error distributions. Here we will  consume with a grain 
of salt. 
These  asymptotic  Bayes  criteria for the  unscaled  and  the  scaled 
models are reported in table 6.3. (The data set for the unscaled model 
has 182 commodities and 72 countries, comprising a total of n = 13,104 
observations. Each factor adds p  = 182  + 72  = 254 parameters. Be- 
cause of  missing GNP data, the scaled model has only 65 countries, 
making  a  total  of  n = 11,830  observations.  Each  factor  adds 
p  = 182  + 65 = 247 parameters.) The numbers in  table 6.3 indicate 
a sharp preference for nine factors in the unscaled model and a slightly 
milder preference for seven factors for the scaled model. The scaling 
might in effect play the role of  one of  the factors, and  it is thus not 
surprising to lose one factor in the scaled model. Possibly the loss of 
the other factor is related to the elimination of seven countries without 
GNP data. 
Table 6.4 reports the ranks of the adjusted trade intensity ratios. The 
last column contains the ranks of the unadjusted trade intensity ratios. 
A comparison of this column with the adjacent one indicates that the 
factor-analytic approach makes dramatic adjustment in  the trade  in- 
tensity ratios. French Guiana, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Hong 
Kong, Saudi Arabia, and Iceland, which all have very large ratios of 
Table 6.3  Choice of Number of  Factors (criterion defined in text) 
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Table 6.4  Ranks of  Openness Measures: Adjusted Trade Intensity Ratios 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model  Unadjusted 
RAMORAMO 0 
Low-income economies 
French Guiana  7  24  47  25  1  19  3  3 
Ethiopia  8  37  14  II  19  13  8  II 
Pakistan  42  36  51  45  29  31  49  40 
Sri Lanka  24  58  45  58  15  60  10  42 
Bangladesh  39  40  48  46  32  49  52  48 
Costa Rica  161  3  814  2  5  2 
Colombia  14  28  II  10  25  10  12  9 
Ecuador  27  42  16  24  24  16  19  14 
Indonesia  53  8  6  5  46  15  16  15 
Cameroon  19  41  35  32  28  17  20  16 
Ivory Coast  564  552  954  119 
Egypt  29  50  50  51  33  48  14  25 
Nicaragua  6  48  34  36  22  34  37  29 
Dominican RP  20  47  23  34  21  45  27  31 
Peru  63  25  19  39  63  20  22  36 
Philippines  54  35  32  30  54  37  32  37 
El  Salvador  12  46  41  43  23  43  43  39 
Turkey  44  34  38  35  40  35  45  41 
Morocco  64  38  46  53  64  52  38  54 
Thailand  55  56  40  55  50  58  48  59 
Lower-middle-income economies 
Upper-middle-income economies 
Hong Kong  2  431  3  3  515 4 
Trinidad and Tobago  II  3  2  2  12  9  9  6 
Panama  22  32  56  50  20  14  30  17 
Jordan  62  44  65  64  59  27  4  18 
Brazil  45  26  15  21  45  24  29  23 
Singapore  13  2  58  4  2  12  60  32 
Portugal  38  51  28  42  34  47  23  33 
Greece  46  45  39  44  41  40  33  35 
Yugoslavia  56  29  43  40  52  38  56  49 
Malaysia  51  63  9  57  61  64  2  50 
Israel  47  39  61  59  31  41  61  51 
Argentina  31  52  12  33  36  57  47  52 
Saudi Arabia  25  918  9  4  I6  I 
Oman  26  10  52  28  8  6  21  8 
United Arab Emirates  17  6  49  12  17  3  25  10 
High-income oil exporters 
Industrial market economies 
Germany FR  41  17  21  15  35  8  7  7 
Japan  37  14  25  13  48  11  17  13 
U.S.A.  40  15  24  14  30  23  39  24 
France  43  21  27  20  39  25  34  28 
Sweden  32  20  42  27  42  39  28  30 
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Table 6.4  (continued) 















50  33 
36  22 
59  23 
60  16 
33  13 
18  7 
30  27 
49  12 
52  49 
10  55 
15  18 
58  31 
57  53 
East European nonmarket economies 












4  62 
31 
34  54 
23  60 
28  43 
21  30 
65  11 
35  57 
9  59 
16  65 
36  31  44  29  44  38 
33  23  37  36  50  43 
44  38  51  32  53  45 
13  19  62  44  41  46 
29  16  43  42  55  47 
53  26  26  21  64  53 
22  22  53  55  42  55 
26  18  57  51  54  56 
37  47  49  56  58  60 
8  29  47  61  57  62 
7  6  55  59  62  63 
60  56  60  46  65  64 
30  49  56  63  63  65 
17  17  38  28  31  27 
4  37  18  4  II  5 
1  1  16  18  13  12 
63  62  5  33  26  20 
59  63  6  50  18  21 
57  54  11  26  36  22 
54  48  7  30  40  26 
64  60  65  7  51  44 
62  61  27  53  59  57 
10  41  13  62  46  58 

























Notes: Seven factors in the scaled model, nine in the unscaled  model. R = resource; 
A = agriculture; M = manufacturing; 0 = overall. Sorted by overall measure, scaled 
model. 
trade to GNP, after adjustment are judged to be relatively closed coun- 
tries. The United States, Hungary, and Brazil, which have low ratios 
of trade to GNP, after adjustment are judged to be moderately open. 
Table 6.5 contains the R2's  by country. Do not be alarmed by negative 
R2's,  which are compatible with the method of  estimation. Both the 
scaled model and the unscaled model fit the data rather well by con- 
ventional standards. The scaled model seems to do a bit better overall, 
but somewhat worse for the larger countries. This finding is not sur- 
prising since the scaled model deals with a heteroskedasticity problem 
that is likely to be present.  Trade in  resource products is very well 
explained but trade in agricultural products is often poorly explained. 
Among the industrial market economies, New Zealand stands out for 172  Edward E. Learner 
Table 6.5  Country RZ 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
R  A  MOR  A  MO 
Low-income economies 
Bangladesh  .94 
Ethiopia  .96 
French Guiana  .97 
Pakistan  .99 
Sri Lanka  .99 
Lower-middle-income economies 
Colombia  .47 
Dominican RP  .98 
Ecuador  .99 
Egypt  .98 
El  Salvador  .98 
Indonesia  .99 
Ivory Coast  .90 
Morocco  .77 
Nicaragua  .95 
Peru  .41 
Philippines  .96 
Thailand  .96 
Turkey  .99 
Cameroon  .99 
Upper-middle-income economies 
Argentina  .64 
Brazil  .97 
Greece  .99 
Hong Kong  .88 
Israel  .99 
Jordan  .93 
Malaysia  .94 
Panama  .99 
Portugal  .99 
Singapore  .99 
Trindad and Tobago  .98 
Yugoslavia  .98 
Oman  .95 
Saudi Arabia  .99 
United Arab Emirates  .78 
Australia  .82 
Austria  .96 
Belgium  .97 
Canada  .99 
Denmark  .90 
Finland  .9 I 
Costa Rica  .nn 
High-income oil  exporters 
Industrial market economies 
.I9 
.20 
-  1.03 



























-  4.57 
-.I7 
-  2.81 
.64 
-  10.56 
.43 
.oo 




.05  .26  .97  .on 
.44  .45  .99  .61 
.I3  .75  .99  .79 
.41  .73  .99  -.05 
.57  .6?  .99  .I7 
.75  .36  .95  .71 
-.98  .26  .99  .88 
.08  .56  .99  .21 
.72  .95  .99  .?4 
.65  .77  .98  .07 
.03  .73  .99  .49 
.03  .26  .99  34 
.46  .70  .79  .I6 
.I4  .54  .99  .54 
.85  .62  .31  .20 
.72  .8S  .95  .I8 
.67  .9n  .99  .24 
.68  .64  .96  -.0S 
.67  .93  .99  -.08 
.68  .83  .99  .63 
.I8  .36  .95  -.I5 
.I9  .91  .96  .39 
.63  .90  .99  .14 
.31  .80  .99  .I2 
.33  .76  .95  .37 
.75  .65  .95  .I5 
.59  .89  .99  31 
.38  .93  .99  .57 
.22  .88  .99  -  1.74 
.55  .84  .97  -.02 
.59  .57  .97  -.72 
.83  .n9  .99  -.oo 
.52  .58  .9n  -.35 
.98  .99  .99  -5.53 
.65  .56  .94  -2.44 
.59  .67  .30  -  .25 
.37  .70  .90  .03 
.97  .98  .86  .02 
.I5  .58  .90  .04 
.I8  .65  .9S  .OO 
.36  .82  .95  -.I5 
.09  .25 
.68  .73 
.93  .97 
.37  .73 
.70  .72 
.n2  .75 
.7n  .89 
.68  .64 
.65  .97 
.81  .78 
.39  .82 
.56  .98 
.47  .62 
.42  .70 
.61  .74 
.81  .55 
.70  .83 
.50  .61 
.37  .90 
.82  .92 
.20  .I7 
.07  .90 
.43  .88 
.95  .93 
.59  .86 
.72  .67 
.69  .92 
.74  .87 
.91  .99 
.52  .95 
.30  .78 
.74  .79 
.68  .99 
.63  .65 
.20  .7n 
.65  .29 
.22  .64 
.I8  .77 
.02  .32 
.03  .52 
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Table 6.5  (continued) 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
R  A  MOR  A  MO 
France  .99  .n8 
Germany FR  .99  .99 
Italy  .99  .94 
Japan  .99  .99 
Ireland  .94  .40 
Netherlands  .99  .90 
New Zealand  .78  .27 
Spain  .99  .26 
Sweden  .96  .67 
Switzerland  .93  -  1.74 
U.S.A.  .99  I  .oo 
United Kingdom  .98  .77 
Norway  .97  -  .61 
East European nonmarket economies 
Czechoslovakia  .I0  -  .46 
Hungary  .68  -  .01 
Other 
Bermuda  .96  -1.12 
Brunei  .98  -517.61 
Cyprus  .98  .I7 
Faeroe Islands  .86  .08 
Fiji  .93  .01 
French Polynesia  .96  -  1.04 
Greenland  .63  .08 
Guadeloupe  .9s  -  .2s 
Iceland  .65  .II 
Martinique  .96  -  .34 
New Caledonia  .66  -2.48 
New Hebrides  .94  .22 
Reunion  .94  -  .I6 
Seychelles  .95  -  .60 
St. Pierre and Miquelon  .98  -  .01 
Tonga  .96  -.I4 
.91  .99  .99 
.99  .99  .98 
.07  .61  .97 
.98  .99  .99 
.99  .99  .97 
.90  .98  .99 
.36  .42  .94 
.4S  .92  .98 
.S1  .96  .99 
.66  .82  .98 
.58  .64  .98 
.99  .99  .97 
.88  .94  .98 
.64  .S6 
.01  .24  .69 
.07  .SO  .99 
.62  .72  .99 
-8.04  .92  .99 
-  1.58  .I7 
p.89  .27  .99 
.I7  .54  .99 
.40  .48  .99 
.37  .49  .98 
.01  .21  .70 
-.I2  .41 
.Sl  .38 
.17  .38 
-  1.73  .70 
-.S7  .32 
-.I8  .I6  .99 
-.09  .42  .99 
.I0 
-3.62 
-  .I7 
-  .22 
-  1.98 
.09 




-  .09 
-  .04 
-.I1 











.37  .94 
.76  .80 
.I7  .so 
.I9  .8S 
.6S  34 
.I4  .86 
.S1  .24 
.80  .96 
.I  1  .93 
.49  .6S 
.I6  .39 
.I7  .74 
.09  .65 
.05  .23 
.67  .86 
,923  .99 
.64  .71 
.OI  .34 
.78  .90 
.8S  .82 
.96  .99 
.83  .82 
.I7  .34 
.59  .67 
Notes: Nine factors for unscaled model, seven for the scaled model.  R  = resources; 
A  = agriculture; M  = manufacturing; 0 = overall. 
its peculiar trade pattern. Other industrial countries in this group with 
unusual trade patterns are Australia and Switzerland. Outside of  this 
group,  Argentina,  Hungary,  and  Bangladesh  are the  most  peculiar 
countries. 
The commodities that contribute most to the absolute residuals, and 
consequently to the measures of openness, are listed in table 6.6. The 
real outlier in this table is road vehicles for the scaled model. The list 174  Edward E. Learner 
Table 6.6  Influential Commodities, Factor Analytic Model (X,~Eu~Xij~Ev~) 


























































































iron and steel shapes 































.01  I 
.01  I 
of  the influential commodities  is about the same for the  scaled and 
unscaled model for both the resource trade and the agricultural trade, 
but rather different for trade in manufactures. Some other influential 
commodities  are coal, iron ore, meat, coffee, wheat,  paper,  special 
transactions, and footwear. 
Finally, table 6.7 reports the commodities for each country with the 
largest estimated residuals based on the scaled model. This table seems 
to be ultimately destructive of  the interpretation of the residuals  as 
trade barriers. Most of the table is composed of export items that are 
unusual for reasons other than trade barriers. To  select a few: Swiss 175  Measures of  Openness 
Table 6.7  Extreme Commodities, Scaled Factor Analytic Model (EG  / XjlEij]) 













































-  ,009 
-  ,008 
.092 
.054 
-  ,040 
-  ,018 
-  .009 
-  .006 
-  ,040 
-  ,016 
-  .015 
P.010 
.089 
-  .016 
-.031 
-  ,013 
,015 
-  ,009 
,019 
,015 
-  ,009 
-  ,008 
-  ,005 




-  ,007 
-  .045 


































-  ,092 
.05 1 
-  ,019 
-  ,016 
-  ,031 
-  ,020 
,087 
-  ,045 
-  ,043 
-  ,028 
,100 
-  ,082 
,074 








alcoholic beverages  .035 
meat, fresh  .085 





road  vehicles 
steel SITC 674 
textile products 
woven textiles 




















road  vehicles 
furniture 
-  ,030 
-  ,023 
,036 
-  ,018 






-  ,043 
-  ,037 
-  ,032 
,032 
-  ,029 
.025 
.035 
-  .028 
-  ,043 
,040 
-  ,040 
-  ,033 
,027 
-  ,020 
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Table 6.7  (continued) 















































-  ,007 
-  ,015 
-  ,008 
.018 
-  .014 
-  .004 
-  .002 
-  .005 
-  .002 
-  .010 
.006 
-  .030 
,007 
-  .033 
-.013 
-  .030 
-  .022 
p.017 
-  .014 
-  .009 
-  .009 
,020 
-  .011 
-  .012 
-  .010 
,018 
,014 
-  ,109 


































-  ,089 
,057 




.33  1 





-  .046 
.035 
-  ,038 
-  ,034 
,031 
-  ,024 
-  ,041 
,025 
,089 
-  ,050 








iron SITC 673 
medicinal products 
telecom equipment 





















animal food  -  ,123  footwear 
-  .026 
.019 
.048 
-  ,023 
-  ,032 
-  ,022 
-  ,044 
-.031 
-  ,026 
-  ,023 
,022 
-  ,022 
,064 
-  ,041 
.033 
-  .030 
-  ,078 
-  ,026 
-  ,070 
.047 
.08  I 
-  ,025 
,056 
,046 
-  ,031 
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Table 6.7  (continued) 


















































-  ,014 
-  ,011 
,007 
,005 
-  ,021 
,010 
-  ,007 
.006 
-  ,031 
-  ,020 
,082 
-  ,009 
,055 
-  .012 
-  .012 
-  .011 
.138 
-  ,033 
-  .01 I 
-  ,009 











































-  .027 
-  ,045 
-  .024 
.192 
-  ,095 
-  ,030 
-  ,016 
-  ,029 
-  ,019 
.  I23 
,114 
,079 
-  ,039 







.01  I 
.I57 
.090 
machinery, nonelect.  ,028 
steel SITC 674  .019 
road vehicles  ,041 
machinery, nonelect.  -  ,039 
organic chemicals  .055 
office machines  ,051 
pearl  .095 
metal manufactures  .087 
machinery.  nonelect.  ,057 
footwear  .054 
machinery SITC 718  .017 
road vehicles  ,017 
road vehicles  ,073 
sound recorders  ,038 
aircraft  -  ,081 
special transactions  -  ,048 
road vehicles  .03 I 
clothing  -  ,023 
pig iron  -  ,029 
furniture  -  ,025 
inorganic elements  ,063 
ships  -  ,031 
machinery SITC 718  -  .058 
special transactions  -  .057 
plastic materials  ,052 
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Table 6.7  (continued) 










































Trinidad and Tobago 
petroleum products 
gas 
-  ,005 
-  ,004 
.079 
-  ,036 
-  ,007 
-  ,006 
.015 





-  .01  I 
-  .007 
-  ,014 
-  .013 
-  ,031 
.018 
-  ,024 
-  ,021 
.012 
-  ,009 
-  ,006 
,005 
,037 
-  ,012 
-  .008 





































-  .047 
.032 




-  .041 
.033 




-  .039 




-  .009 
,115 
,100 
-  ,086 
-  ,044 
,038 
medicinal products  -  ,043 
agricultural machinery -  ,029 
aircraft  -  ,032 
fertilizer, manufact.  ,028 
woven textiles  .064 
textile products  .045 
special transactions  -  ,041 
road  vehicles  -  .039 
telecom equipment  -  ,018 
ships  ,018 
machinery, nonelect.  -  ,031 
road vehicles  ,026 
road  vehicles  -  ,032 
textile products  ,032 
special transactions  ,073 
coal  .049 
special transactions  .095 
coal  .066 
iron SlTC 673  ,036 
machinery, nonelect.  -  ,033 
road  vehicles  ,041 
telecom equipment  ,029 
watches  ,076 
road vehicles  -  .073 
special transactions  -  .035 
organic chemicals  -  .021 
structures  ~  .035 
pig iron  -  .021 
special transactions  -  ,078 
coal  -  ,047  tin  -  .018  cocoa  -  .025 179  Measures of Openness 
Table 6.7  (continued) 
Resources  Agriculture  Manufacturing 
United Arab Emirates 
fertilizers  -  ,010 
silver SITC 681  -  ,008 
Turkey 
other minerals  ,014 
iron and steel  -  ,010 
United Kingdom 
base metal  -  ,014 
copper  -  ,010 
U.S.A. 
coal  ,033 
petroleum products  ,009 
Yugoslavia 
aluminium  ,017 



















-  .020 











-  .087 
-  .060 
.036 
-  .032 
-  .046 
.036 
-  ,077 
,049 
.060 
-  .040 
watches, wheat for Argentina, coal for Australia, road vehicles (-) for 
Austria, iron and steel for Belgium, paper for Canada, beverages for 
France. 
For one such as myself who started this exercise with high hopes of 
detecting barriers in net export data, this table is sobering indeed. It 
now  seems pretty clear that  the  unusual  aspects of  patterns  of  net 
exports occur mostly from the export side and are related to historical 
factors or to special resources, and not to trade barriers. It may well 
be that a separate study of the import side would be productive. 
6.5  Measures of Peculiarity and Openness using a Regression Model 
The alternative to factor analysis is a regression study in which the 
determinants of  net exports are explicitly identified. A model of  this 
form was used by  Leamer (1984) to explain net exports in  1958 and 
1975. The same model with two additions is estimated here using the 
1982 three-digit  SITC data. The following explanatory variables are 
more fully defined in Leamer (1984): 
Capital: Accumulated and discounted gross domestic investment, as- 
Labor: Three labor variables distinguishing levels of skill. (The lowest 
Land: Four land variables distinguishing climate types. 
Oil production: Value of oil and gas production. 
suming an average life of fifteen years. 
skill category is an estimate of the illiterate work force.) 180  Edward E. Learner 
Coal: Value of production of coal. 
Minerals: Value of production of  minerals. 
Distance: GNP-weighted average distance to markets.  The distance 
between countries is the airline distance between capitals. 
Trade balance: Net exports of the 183 three-digit SITC commodities. 
Two new variables not used in  Learner (1984) are included in this 
list. The first is distance to markets, which serves as a proxy for natural 
barriers  to  trade.  Distance  ought  to  reduce net  exports  in absolute 
value, which is a feature that cannot be captured in a net export model 
that is easy to estimate. For  ease of estimation, the distance variable 
is simply entered linearly in the equation. The second variable is the 
trade balance, which the theory in  section 6.2 suggests can affect the 
level of  trade intensity. The decision to exclude the trade balance in 
Learner (1984) reflects concerns about the endogeneity of this variable, 
which would affect the estimation and interpretation of the other coef- 
ficients in the model. In this chapter, interest focuses on the residuals, 
not the coefficients, and the question of endogeneity is secondary. 
A heteroskedastic model with residual standard error proportional 
to GNP (the scaled model) is superior to a homoskedastic model in 
terms  of  overall  fit.  Estimates  based  on  both  models  are generally 
reported in  the tables. Table 6.8 contains the adjusted trade intensity 
ratios for the set of countries for which it is possible to compile the 
data on the variables listed above.4  Table 6.9 contains the corresponding 
Table 6.8  Openness Measures: Adjusted Trade Intensity Ratios; Regression 
Model 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
R  A  M  0  RAM0 
Low-income economies 
Bangladesh  -.I6 
Ethiopia  -  .24 
Pakistan  -  .04 
Sri  Lanka  -  .I4 
Lower-middle-income economies 
Peru  -  .24 
Cameroon  -  .I5 
Colombia  -  .06 
Egypt  -  .09 
Philippines  -  .01 
El  Salvador  -  .20 
Nicaragua  -  .34 
Ecuador  -  .04 
Indonesia  .04 
Morocco  .04 
-.I8 
-  .50 
-  .O1 
-.I3 
-.I9 
-  .21 
-  .oo 
-  .03 
-  .04 
-  .30 
-  .38 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .09 
-  .41 
-  1.2 
.02 
-  .36 
-  .30 
-  .44 
-  .I0 
-  .21 
-.I0 
-  .52 
-  .68 
-  .07 
.0l 
-  .24 
-.75  -.0l  -.03  -.03  -.07 
-  1.9  -.02  -.02  .01  -.04 
-.03  -.02  -.03  .03  -.02 
-.63  .OO  -.00  .01  .01 
-.73  -.08 
-  .80  -.02 
-.I6  -.07 
-.33  -.00 
-.I5  -.03 
-I  .02 
-  1.4  -.00 
-.I4  -.05 
.04  .03 
-.29  .OO 
-  .08 
-  .08 
-  .05 
-  .02 
-  .03 
-  .01 
-  .02 
.0  I 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .05 
-  .09 
-  .OO 
-  .06 
.  00 
-  .06 
-  .03 
.  00 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .21 
-.I9 
-  .I3 
-  .08 
-  .05 
-  .05 
-  .05 
-  .04 
-  .02 
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Table 6.8  (continued) 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
R  A  M  ORAMO 
Dominican RP  -  .08 
Thailand  .01 
Costa Rica  -  .30 
Turkey  .03 
Ivory Coast  -  .I4 
Upper-middle-income economies 
Panama  -  .27 
Argentina  -  .04 
Brazil  .  00 
Portugal  -  .06 
Greece  -  .02 
Yugoslavia  .01 
Israel  .02 
Trinidad and Tobago  .04 
Malaysia  -  .01 
Hong Kong  -  .05 
Singapore  .37 
Saudi Arabia  -  .oo 
Australia  -  .01 
Canada  -  .00 
U.S.A.  .  00 
France  -  .01 
Austria  -  .01 
U.K.  .02 
Spain  .02 
Japan  .oo 
Sweden  .01 
Germany FR  .oo 
Switzerland  -  .02 
Italy  .01 
Norway  .I0 
Denmark  .03 
Finland  .03 
Belgium  .05 
Netherlands  .I0 
New Zealand  -  .09 
Ireland  .02 
High-income oil exporters 
Industrial market economies 
Other 
Cyprus  -  .37 
Fiji  -  1.7 
Iceland  -  .76 
-.I2 
-  .01 
-  .36 
-  .oo 
.05 
-  .26 
-  .03 
-  .oo 
.02 
.03 





-  .1  I 
-  .01 
-  .oo 






-  .OO 
.  00 










-  .s9 
-  2. I 
-  .73 
-  .26 
-  .I4 
-  .70 
-  .01 
-  .23 
-  .46 
-  .07 
-  .00 
-  .I0 
-  .03 
.  00 
.05 
-  .09 




.0  1 
-  .00 





.  00 








-  .02 
-  .03 
-  .05 
-  .93 
-  3.9 
-  1.3 
-  .46 
-  .I4 
-  1.4 
.02 
-  .32 
-  .99 
-  .14 
.  00 
-  .15 
-  .02 
-  .oo 
.09 




-  .01 
-  .01 
















-  .I0 
.  00 
-  1.9 
-  7.7 
-  2.8 
.01 
.01 




-  .01 
-  .02 
-  .I2 
-  .06 
.OO 
-  .01 
.I4 
.04 
-  .02 
.32 
-  .04 
-  .05 
-  .01 
-  .02 
-  .O1 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .00 
.oo 
-  .01 
.03 




-  .OO 
.05 
.I0 
-  .oo 
.02 
-  .01 







-  .04 
-  .07 
-  .07 
.  0s 
.03 
-  .01 
.02 
-  .01 
.I4 
.06 
-  .03 
-  .05 
-  .03 
-  .0s 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .01 
.01 
.01 
-  .05 
-  .01 
-  .03 









-  .04 
-  .04 
.04 
-.03  P.01 
-  .01  .03 
.01  .05 
.02  .as 
.06  .19 
-.05  -.21 
-.05  -.I3 
-.02  -.I1 
-.02  -.I0 
-.01  -.04 
.05  .04 
.I1  .I2 
.I4  .27 
.I3  .31 
.37  .42 
.22  31 
.01  -.08 
-.04  -.I1 
-  .02  -.07 
-.02  -.os 
-.00  -.03 
.03  .00 
.01  .00 
-.oo  .oo 
.04  -.OO 
.03  .01 
.07  .07 
.13  .08 
.08  .I0 
.05  .II 
.06  .I2 
.06  .I2 
.I3  .20 
.05  .20 
.I1  .21 
.I2  .26 
-  .01  -.06 
-.02  -.05 
.01  .07 
Notc,s: R  = resources; A  = agriculture: M  = manufacturing: 0 = overall. Sorted by 
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Table 6.9  Ranks of  Openness Measures: Adjusted Trade Intensity Ratios; 
Regression Model 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
R  A  M  0  R  A  M  OTIR 
Low-income economies 
Bangladesh  10  II 
Ethiopia  74 
Pakistan  22  22 
Sri Lanka  13  13 
Peru  8  10 
Cameroon  II  9 
Colombia  18  26 
Egypt  15  18 
Nicaragua  45 
El Salvador  97 
Philippines  29  17 
Ecuador  20  20 
Morocco  48  16 
Indonesia  49  21 
Dominican RP  16  14 
Thailand  37  25 
Turkey  45  28 
Costa Rica  56 
Lower-middle-income economies 
Ivory Coast  12  49 
Upper-middle-income economies 
Panama  6 
Argentina  21 
Brazil  34 
Portugal  17 
Greece  24 
Yugoslavia  36 
Israel  42 
Trinidad and Tobago  47 
Malaysia  26 
Hong Kong  19 
Singapore  53 
High-income oil exporters 
Saudi Arabia  30 
Industrial market economies 
Australia  28 
Canada  31 
U.S.A.  32 
France  27 
Spain  40 
U.K.  41 
Austria  25 
Sweden  38 
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Table  6.9  (continued) 
















35  35  39  37  46  16  43  38  11 
23  36  51  46  I1  22  49  39  20 
39  46  50  45  41  34  44  40  19 
52  33  47  50  50  37  38  41  33 
46  52  45  47  30  47  40  42  30 
44  51  48  49  37  46  41  44  24 
51  50  29  48  51  45  37  46  34 
50  47  52  52  49  40  50  47  36 
14  42  28  24  28  50  46  48  37 
43  45  25  33  43  52  47  49  43 
3  3  4  4  26  9  17  13  46 
1  1  1  1  34  11  13  15  41 
2  2  2  2  45  43  27  37  48 
Notes:  R = resources; A = agriculture; M = manufacturing; 0 = overall; TIR = rank 
of trade intensity ratio. 
ranks. The last column of table 6.9 reports the ranks of the unadjusted 
trade intensity ratios. 
Controlling for the resources listed, and for distance and the trade 
balance, the regression analysis makes some dramatic changes in the 
measures of openness. For example, Panama, which has a very high 
overall trade intensity ratio, has the lowest adjusted ratio, using the 
scaled model.  Thus, although  Panama is very trade dependent, her 
resources suggest that she should be even more so. Peru and Cameroon 
are essentially the same. 
According to the adjusted trade intensities in table 6.9 the countries 
with  the highest barriers to trade are Panama, Peru, Cameroon, and 
Argentina. The most open countries are Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Malaysia. 
For many of the less-developed countries, the adjustment to the trade 
intensity  ratio  makes  them appear less open. The measures for the 
industrial market economies tend to adjust in the opposite way, with 
relatively  low trade intensity ratios but relatively high openness mea- 
sures. For example, the United States has the lowest trade intensity, 
equal to 7 percent of GNP (table 6.1). If the scaled model is used, the 
United States ranks eighteenth in terms of overall openness, though it 
is only third among the industrial market economies. If the unscaled 
model is used, which  emphasizes these bigger countries, the United 
States moves up to number thirty-four. A fairly big change among these 184  Edward E. Learner 
countries is that Australia and Canada are estimated as not very open, 
even though  they  rank  ahead of  several  other of these countries in 
terms of trade intensity.  Note also that the anomaly of low Japanese 
trade in agricultural products remains unexplained; similarly for West 
Germany. Two other anomalies are the relatively  low resource trade 
of Switzerland and New Zealand. 
The choice between the ordering in table 6.2 and the adjusted or- 
dering in table 6.9 depends completely on the quality of the model that 
underlies the adjustment. Now  we must begin the criticism phase of 
the analysis to decide if  the model seems to be doing the job as well 
as it can be done. We  are attributing the residuals in the model com- 
pletely to the trade barriers, which is obviously incorrect if  there are 
omitted  variables that could account for a significant portion of the 
unexplained variability of trade. 
The first criticism of the model is that it does not explain the trade 
of many countries very well. Table 6.10 contains country R2’s  indicating 
the proportion of the variability of trade that is explained by the model. 
These R2’s are much lower than the factor-analytic RZ’s  reported in 
table 6.5. Table 6.10 indicates that in terms of R2’s,  the model does a 
relatively poor job of explaining the trade composition of about a third 
of the countries. Remember that the model is estimated separately for 
each commodity. Although the R2’s  for each commodity must be pos- 
itive, the R2’s  for each country need not be. In fact, there are quite a 
few  negative  country R2’s. Unlike  the factor-analysis  results, there 
appears in table 6.10 to be no tendency for the model to work relatively 
well on one or more of the subsets of commodities. 
Table 6.10  Country R2,  Regression Model 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
RA  MOKAMO 
Low-income economies 
Pakistan  .67  .22  .27  .54  .I5  -.90  .43  .I2 
Bangladesh  -  I7  -2.9  -  15  -11  .85  .70  .91  .82 
Sri Lanka  .62  -.34  -2.2  .01  .97  .65  ,238  .87 
Ethiopia  -4.2  -2.7  -  I00  -  13  .74  .98  .79  .90 
Lower-middle-income economies 
Peru  -27  -19  -7.7  -  I6  -3.2  -4.2  .59  -1.5 
Colombia  -31  .41  -2.2  -  .92  -38  .52  .79  -.44 
Costa Rica  -12-.51  -16-2.3-1.6  .64  .45  .43 
Dominican RP  -3.1  -1.3  -25  -3  .95  .02  .I0  .51 
Philippines  .66  -.I7  -  1.9  .24  .70  -.92  .57  .52 
El  Salvador  -3.5  -4.7  -41  -6.2  .77  .09  -.I8  .53 
Thailand  .52  .07  -  1.7  .21  .78  .I4  .33  .56 185  Measures of Openness 
Table 6.10  (continued) 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
RA  MORAMO 
Cameroon  -  1.5 
Morocco  -  .69 
Ivory Coast  -  .51 
Egypt  -.I6 
Nicaragua  -11 
Turkey  .63 
Ecuador  .96 
lndonesia  .97 
Upper-middle-income economies 
Argentina  -  7.3 
Portugal  .65 
Hong Kong  -  2.9 
Panama  -I 
Brazil  I .oo 
Trinidad and Tobago  .13 
Greece  .97 
Yugoslavia  .88 
Malaysia  .89 
Israel  .85 
Singapore  .74 
Saudi Arabia  1 .OO 
U.S.A.  1 .00 
Australia  .72 
Austria  -  .59 
U.K.  .30 
Switzerland  -  1.6 
Ireland  -  .70 
Netherlands  .54 
Germany FR  .98 
New Zealand  -9.5 
Denmark  .24 
Finland  .70 
Japan  1  .OO 
Sweden  .77 
Canada  .99 
France  .92 
Belgium  .92 
Norway  .66 
Italy  .89 
Spain  .96 
High-income oil exporters 
Industrial market economies 
Other 
Cyprus  -  16 
Iceland  -  43 




-  .38 
-  2.6 
-  .47 




-  .75 
-7.8 
.99 
-  13 
-  .25 
-  1.1 
.41 
-  .48 
















-  .09 
.I  1 
.47 
.09 
-  .58 
-  18 
-  .71 
-  15 
-  15 





-  .69 
.81 
-  2.7 
-  .31 
.I8 
-  10 
.97 
-.lo 
-  .33 
-  .75 
.26 
.24 







-  .95 
-1 
.98 
-  2.3 
-  .06 
-  .85 
1 .00 






-  .99 
-  15 
-  54 




-  1.2 




-  .82 
.4  1 
-  .  18 











-  .20 
.39 
-  .51 
-  .45 
.42 
.98 











-  I5 
-  6.3 










-  .46 











-  4.4 
-  .94 
-  .47 
-  .89 
-  .85 
-  .04 
.06 



















-  .44 
.55 
-  .37 
-  1.3 
-  .03 
-  .39 
.I2 
-6.6 
-  1.1 
-  .40 
-  1.1 
.29 
.34 
-  .49 
-  3.9 
-  1.8 
.38 
-  .97 











-  2.9 
-  .61 
.24 
-  1.3 




.50  .60 
.36  .61 
.62  .62 
.64  .76 
.53  .87 
.69  .90 
.81  .90 
-.93  -1.2 
.40  -  .I9 
.I4  -.08 
.28  .I4 
-  1.1  .19 
.60  .43 
.25  .54 
.38  .58 
.60  .69 
.25  .79 
.80  .83 
.94  .99 
-  1.5  -3.9 
.06  -  1.5 
-.36  -.63 
-1.1  -.54 
-  .09  -.36 
.10  -.32 
.I4  -.01 
.I1  .06 
.I3  .26 
.05  .33 
.I8  .43 
.14  .44 
.09  .48 
.78  .60 
-  1.7  .67 
-  .08  .68 
.66  .72 
.I2  .73 
-  1.5  .85 
-.I1  .62 
.66  .15 
.63  .71 
.82  .93 186  Edward E. Learner 
The lack of fit is meant to suggest inadequacies in the model: non- 
linearities, unmeasured  resources, or trade  barriers.  Why  does the 
scaled model do so poorly in explaining the trade of Peru, Argentina, 
the United States, and Australia? Note also the dramatic differences 
in the RZ’s  for the scaled and unscaled model. Many of these differences 
are due to the relatively heavy weight put on the larger countries in 
the unscaled version. An example is the United States, which is such 
an extreme country in  the unscaled  model that  the fit  is essentially 
perfect, but it is very poor in the scaled model in which the U.S. data 
are the very small numbers implied by very low trade intensity ratios. 
Because of the quality of  the fits, it is best to think of the unscaled 
model as describing the larger countries, primarily the industrial market 
economies, and to think of the scaled model as describing the smaller 
countries. 
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 contain  “intervention”  rates, which, like the 
R2’s,  measure the size of the estimated residuals. The principal differ- 
ence is that the intervention rates use the absolute residuals, not the 
squares thereof, which reduces the influence of  the largest residuals. 
The residuals are compared with GNP in table 6.11 and with predicted 
net trade in table 6.12. 
Countries are sorted in table 6.11 from largest to smallest values of 
the intervention  rates  to produce  an ordering comparable with  the 
adjusted trade intensity ratio (a country that intervenes little is an open 
country). Discrepancies between these intervention rates and the ad- 
Table 6.11  Intervention Rates,  Regression Model (Ej  I Eii I  / CAPj) 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
RAMO  RAMO 
Low-income economies 
Bangladesh  .I6 
Ethiopia  .24 
Pakistan  .04 
Sri Lanka  .I4 
Lower-middle-income economies 
Turkey  .06 
Dominican RP  .I9 
Ecuador  .05 
Indonesia  .05 
Philippines  .07 
Nicaragua  .36 
Colombia  .08 
Egypt  .I1 
Cameroon  .24 
.26  .47  .89  .02  .05 
.55  1.25  2.04  .03  .04 
.07  .I1  .22  .05  .I0 
.34  .48  .95  .04  .I5 
.08  .I0  .24  .03  .08 
.26  .32  .77  .02  .I1 
.I2  .I7  .33  .05  .07 
.05  .06  .I7  .09  .06 
.I0  .I9  .36  .05  .09 
.52  .79  1.68  .02  .I2 
.I0  .I9  .37  .09  .I1 
.I5  .31  .57  .05  .I1 
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Table 6.11  (continued) 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
RAMORAMO 
Thailand  .09 
El  Salvador  .27 
Peru  .31 
Morocco  .22 
Ivory Coast  .I5 
Costa Rica  .39 
Upper-middle-income economies 
Brazil  .oo 
Yugoslavia  .04 
Israel  .05 
Greece  ,03 
Argentina  .05 
Panama  .28 
Malaysia  .I0 
Portugal  .II 
Hong Kong  .I7 
Singapore  .50 
Saudi Arabia  .O1 
Canada  .  00 
France  .02 
Spain  .02 
U.K.  .02 
U.S.A.  .oo 
Italy  .03 
Norway  .II 
Austria  .05 
Japan  .oo 
Sweden  .04 
Australia  .02 
Germany FR  .01 
Denmark  .05 
Finland  .05 
Switzerland  .06 
Belgium  .05 
Netherlands  .I1 
New Zealand  .I7 
Ireland  .I5 
Fiji  1.90 
Iceland  .89 
Cyprus  .58 
Trinidad and Tobago  .35 
High-income oil exporters 
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Table 6.12  Intervention Rates, Regression Model (Ej I Eij  1  / xj  1  N*i, 1) 
~~ 
Unscaled Model  Scaled Model 
R  AMORAMO 
Low-income economies 
Bangladesh  .90 
Ethiopia  .85 
Sri Lanka  .54 
Pakistan  .47 
Lower-middle-income economies 
Cameroon  1.03 
Indonesia  .30 
Ecuador  .31 
Nicaragua  .89 
Egypt  .72 
Peru  .95 
Philippines  .82 
Colombia  .99 
El  Salvador  1.03 
Morocco  2.20 
Dominican RP  1.42 
Thailand  1.09 
Turkey  1.31 
Costa Rica  .99 
Ivory Coast  .68 
Upper-middle-income  economies 
Panama  .74 
Singapore  1.16 
Greece  .29 
Brazil  .06 
Argentina  .87 
Portugal  .61 
Israel  .80 
Yugoslavia  .58 
Malaysia  .51 
Trinidad and Tobago  1.68 
Hong Kong  1.44 
Saudi Arabia  .02 
Canada  .05 
Australia  .27 
Norway  I .42 
Spain  .34 
France  .23 
Sweden  .79 
Japan  .04 
Austria  .76 
U.S.A.  .03 
U.K.  2.36 
High-income oil exporters 
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Table 6.12  (continued) 







































1.62  1.75 
1.58  1.09 
.I7  .I9 
3.46  1.89 
1.94  1.98 
3.94  2.25 
1.24  1.29 
1.07  1.49 
1.11  1.27 
.99  1.01 
.96  1.03 
.93  1.00 
.67  1.94 
.57  1.61 
1.87  1.18 
.67  1.78 
.74  2.65 
.80  1.32 
1.06  2.30 
2.53  1.80 
1.86  3.27 
.57  .31 
.80  1.00 
.87  1.07 
1.83  1.43 
2.97  1.52 
2.15  1.70 
3.27  1.77 
2.57  1.84 
4.42  1.92 
3.19  2.09 
2.02  2.12 
1.89  2.20 
.28  .34 
.55  .73 
.so  .79 
Notes: See table 6.10. 
justed trade intensity ratios occur when the large positive and large 
negative residuals offset each other in the computation of the adjusted 
trade intensity ratio, making a country appear to be only average on 
the  openness  scale, but  nonetheless  to intervene  a great  deal. For 
example, among the industrialized countries, Canada is the second least 
open  economy, but  also  appears  not  to intervene  very  much. This 
suggests that  many  of  the  other industrialized  countries  have large 
positive residuals, which make them appear more open and more in- 
terventionist. Among low-income economies, Sri Lanka is estimated 
to intervene a lot, but is also estimated to be very “open.”  Generally 
speaking, there are major differences in the measures of  intervention 
and the measures of openness. 
The intervention rates in table 6.12 are comparable with RZ’s  and 
are ordered from  smallest to largest. When these intervention rates 
exceed one, the model is not performing very well  in the sense that 
the residuals  are generally  larger than  predicted trade. There  are a 
distressing number of  large numbers  in  table  6.12. It  seems highly 
unlikely that these large residuals should be attributed completely to 
trade barriers. 
The commodities that contribute most to all of these measures are 
listed in tables 6.13 and 6.14. The biggest residuals are petroleum and 
petroleum products. In part, this is a consequence of the fact that these 
categories of  trade are relatively large, but we hoped that the oil pro- 
duction variable together with capital and labor would offer a good 190  Edward E. Learner 
Table 6.13  Influential Commodities, Scaled Model  (Xi 1 Ev I /Xv  1 Eli  1) 






























































Resources  Agriculture  Manufacturing 






























-  .03 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .21 
-  .05 
.04 
.02 
-  .02 
-  .01 
.I4 
-  .03 
-  .02 
-  .01 
.01 
-  .01 
-  .04 
-  .04 
-  .03 


























veg oil, hard 
-.lo 
-  .05 










-  .03 
-  .03 




-  .I0 
-  .06 
.03 
-  .03 
.02 
-  .02 














steel SITC 674 
mach., elec. 
special transaction 




steel SITC 674 




-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 






-  .01 
-  .05 
-  .05 
.03 
.02 
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Table 6.14  (continued) 


















































-  .04 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .01 
.01 





-  .01 
.01 
-  .I4 
.07 
-  .02 
.01 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .04 
-  .02 
.01 
.01 
-  .01 
.01 
.I4 
-  .I4 
.01 
-  .01 
.01 




-  .01 
.O1 
.01 
-  .09 
.05 
-  .02 
.01 
-  .O1 










































-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .I0 
-  .I0 
.06 
-  .04 
-  .03 
.02 
-  .09 
-  .05 
-  .01 
.O1 
.01 
-  .01 
-  .I4 
.05 
.05 
-  .03 
-  .03 
-  .02 
.06 
.06 
-  .05 
-  .03 
-  .03 
-  .02 
.I3 
.09 
-  .05 
-  .03 
.02 
-  .02 
-.I3 
.05 
-  .03 
.02 
.02 
sugar  -  .01 




road  vehicles 
iron SITC 673 
road vehicles 
footwear 















































-  .03 




-  .04 
.02 





-  .02 
.02 
.01 
-  .01 
.01 
-  .03 
.03 
-  .02 
-  .01 
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Table 6.14  (continued) 
Resources  Agriculture  Manufacturing 
Denmark 
petroleum products  -  .06 
petroleum  .05 
coal  -  .02 
gas  .01 
base metal  .  00 
aluminium  -  .oo 
Dominican Republic 
petroleum products  -  .04 
petroleum  -  .03 
tin  -  .01 
coal  .01 
fertilizers  -  .01 
aluminium  -  .oo 
Ecuador 
petroleum  -  .I4 
petroleum products  .07 
gas  -  .03 
fertilizers  .01 
coal  .o 1 
aluminium  -  .01 
Egypt 
petroleum products  ~  .08 
petroleum  .07 
aluminium  .02 
coal  -  .oo 
fertilizers  .oo 
gas  -  .oo 
El Salvador 
petroleum  -.I0 
petroleum products  .03 
aluminium  -  .oo 
coal  .oo 
fertilizers  .oo 
gas  -  .oo 
Ethiopia 
petroleum products  .I5 
gas  .03 
petroleum  -  .02 
fertilizers  -  .02 
coal  -  .01 
tin  .01 
Fiji 
petroleum products  -  .I3 
petroleum  .I1 
aluminium  .02 
tin  -  .01 
coal  -  .01 















































-  .03 
.I9 
-  .07 
-  .03 
-  .03 
.03 
~  .03 
-  .02 
.05 
.04 
-  .02 
.02 
.02 
-  .02 
.05 
-  .03 
.03 
.03 
-  .03 
-  .03 
-  .07 
-  .07 
.06 
.04 
-  .03 
-  .03 




-  .02 
-  .02 
.II 
-  .05 
-  .05 
.03 
-  .03 












































-  .02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .04 
.02 
.02 




-  .02 
.01 
-  .01 
.01 
-  .01 
-  .04 








-  .02 
.02 
.02 
-  .04 
.04 
-  .03 
-  .03 
.02 
-  .01 
-  .02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .02 
.02 
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Table 6.14  (continued) 



















































-  .04 
-  .01 
-  .01 
.01 
-  .01 
.08 
-  .02 
-  .01 
.01 
.oo 
-  .oo 
-.I1 












-  .09 
-  .oo 
.oo 
-  .oo 
.  00 
-  .05 
.04 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .oo 
-  .20 
.09 
.07 














































-  .04 




~  .03 
-  .03 
.03 
-  .02 
-  .02 
s  .02 
-  .04 
-  .04 
-  .02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .01 





-  .01 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .01 
.23 
-  .06 
-  .05 
-  .02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .04 
-  .02 
.02 

















































-  .01 
-  .01 




-  .02 
-  .02 
.13 
.05 




-  .05 
-  .03 






-  .03 
.02 
-  .02 
.02 
.02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .01 
.03 
-  .02 
.02 
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Table 6.14  (continued) 


















































-  .I4 
.I2 
-  .01 
.01 
-  .01 





-  .01 
-  .oo 
-  .08 
.04 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .oo 
.oo 
.II 




-  .oo 
-  .07 
.07 
-  .02 
-  .01 
.01 
-  .oo 
.04 
.04 
-  .03 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
.09 
.06 
-  .02 


















































-  .02 
.02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .05 
-  .03 
-  .02 
-  .02 





-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .04 
-  .03 
-  .03 
-  .03 
-  .02 





-  .02 
.02 
.06 
-  .04 
-  .04 
.03 
-  .02 
































machinery SITC 718 
road vehicles 











-  .04 
.02 




-  .05 
-  .04 
.03 







-  .03 
-  .03 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .OI 
-  .01 
.10 





-  .03 
-  .03 
-  .03 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .04 
.04 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .02 
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Table 6.14  (continued) 


















































-  .24 
.07 
.05 
-  .01 
.01 
-  .oo 
.07 
-  .05 
.02 
-  .01 
.oo 
.oo 
-  .04 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .01 





-  .02 





-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .01 
.22 
-  .09 
-  .oo 
-  .oo 
-  .oo 
-  .oo 
.I6 
-.I3 
-  .03 
.02 
-  .02 














































-  .02 






-  .02 
.01 
.09 
-  .07 
-  .06 





-  .02 
.02 
-  .01 
.01 
.06 




-  .02 
-  .04 
-  .02 




-  .05 
-  .05 
-  .04 
-  .03 










steel SlTC 674 
plastic materials 


































-  .02 
.02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .05 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .02 
-  .02 
.02 
.02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .03 
.02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
.01 
-  .01 
.05 
.03 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .05 
-  .04 
-  .03 
.02 
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Table 6.14  (continued) 





















































-  .02 
.01 
.I9 
-  .I2 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .01 
.oo 
.I8 
-  .03 
-  .03 
-  .02 
-  .02 
.01 




-  .oo 
.oo 
-  .04 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .01 
.01 
.06 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .01 
.01 















































-  .06 
.06 
.05 
-  .04 
.02 
.02 
-  .03 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
.02 
.01 
-  .04 
-  .04 
-  .04 








-  .01 
.03 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
.10 
-  .05 
-  .05 




-  .05 
-  .05 
.03 
.03 











































-  .04 
.03 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .01 
-  .05 
-  .03 




-  .02 
.02 
.02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .01 
.06 
.04 
-  .03 
.02 
-  .02' 
-  .01 
.07 
-  .04 
.03 
-  .03 
.03 
-  .02 
.03 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .01 
.01 
-  .01 
.06 
-  .05 
.03 
.02 
-  .02 
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Table 6.14  (continued) 
Resources  Agriculture  Manufacturing 
Switzerland 
petroleum  .09 
petroleum products  -  .03 
coal  .01 
gas  .01 
aluminium  .01 
base metal  .oo 
Thailand 
petroleum products  -  .09 
gas  -  .03 
tin  .01 
base metal  -  .oo 
iron and steel  -  .oo 
copper  -  .oo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
petroleum products  .32 
petroleum  .09 
gas  -  .03 
aluminium  -  .01 
coal  -  .01 
iron ore  -  .01 
Turkey 
petroleum  -  .07 
petroleum products  -  .02 
other minerals  .01 
gas  -  .01 
iron and steel  -  .01 
tin  -  .01 
United Kingdom 
petroleum products  -  .I1 
gas  -  .06 
petroleum  -  .03 
silver SITC 681  .01 
fertilizers  .01 
aluminium  -  .01 
United States 
petroleum products  -  .I7 
petroleum  -.I5 
gas  -  .06 
coal  .01 
fertilizers  .01 
aluminium  -  .oo 
Yugoslavia 
gas  -  .06 
petroleum products  -  .06 
petroleum  .05 
aluminium  .01 
coal  -  .01 
base metal  -  .01 
fruit, fresh  -  .03 
coffee  -  .02 
cocoa  -  .02 
meat, fresh  -  .01 
fish, fresh  .01 
alcoholic beverages  -  .01 
rice  .08 
veg.,  fresh  .06 
tea  -  .06 
sugar  .05 
fish, fresh  .04 
maize  .02 
fish, fresh  -  .03 
meat, fresh  -  .01 
veg., fresh  -  .01 
wheat  -  .01 
paper  .01 
cocoa  .01 
cotton  .04 
fruit, fresh  .04 
tobac., unman.  .04 
animals  .04 
tea  -  .03 
sugar  .02 
meat, fresh  -  .02 
fruit, fresh  -  .02 
paper  -  .01 
alcoholic beverages  .01 
fish, fresh  .01 
veg., fresh  -  .01 
oil seeds  .02 
maize  .02 
animal food  .01 
fish, fresh  .01 
meat, fresh  -  .01 
wood, shaped  .01 
fruit, fresh  -  .03 
rubber  -  .02 
fish, fresh  .02 
tea  -  .02 
Pulp  -  .01 











































-  .07 





-  .04 




-  .01 
-  .04 
-  .03 
-  .02 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .02 
.03 
-  .02 
.02 
-  .02 
.02 
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explanation of  trade in petroleum products. Part of the problem may 
be the difficulty of predicting the location of petroleum refineries, which 
may indeed be greatly influenced by policy interventions. After petro- 
leum, fish is a problem commodity. This is suggestive of  an omitted 
resource variable: coastline or access to fisheries. Coffee and fruit are 
also problem commodities. The land variables include land suited to 
tropical agricultural production, and in  principle this should help ex- 
plain trade in coffee and fruit. Is it possible that trade in  these items 
is influenced by policy interventions? The one clear positive note is 
that clothing is the manufactured commodity for which the interven- 
tions seem most significant. That seems to square well with the facts. 
Table 6.14 contains the same information for each country. A negative 
number in table 6.14 means that actual net exports are less than pre- 
dicted by the model. Either exports are too small or imports too great, 
at least as judged by the behavior of the other countries in the sample. 
A positive number means that net exports are large compared with the 
other countries; either exports are too large or imports too small. A 
positive number thus suggests either an export subsidy or an import 
barrier, higher than other countries’. A negative number, on the other 
hand, suggests either an unusually low export subsidy or an unusually 
low import  barrier.  In a word,  positive  means relatively  protected, 
negative relatively unprotected. 
Take a good  look at  this  table and try  to form a judgment as to 
whether it gives a sense of the products that are significantly affected 
by trade barriers.  Keep in mind,  however,  that products with small 
valuation at the three-digit SITC level cannot appear in these tables 
since their residuals would be correspondingly small. 
Consider the first country, Argentina, which has one of the lowest 
overall R2’s.  Ten  percent  of  its sum of  absolute residuals  is due to 
overpredicting fish net exports, 8 percent from underpredicting petro- 
leum products net exports, and so forth. The data suggest that Argen- 
tina’s fish sector is relatively unprotected and that the petroleum products 
sector is protected or subsidized, compared with other countries. 
Look at a couple of other countries, say, the United States and Japan. 
The United States has unpredictably  low levels of net exports of pe- 
troleum products and petroleum, but appears to protect or subsidize 
machinery  and aircraft.  Japan  protects  or subsidizes road  vehicles. 
Japan’s unusually high net exports of petroleum products are offset by 
unusually low net exports of petroleum. Incidentally, this feature recurs 
for many countries and  suggests that  the model is incapable of  ex- 
plaining the location of petroleum refining. The measures that depend 
on these residuals therefore need to be viewed with suspicion. 
As I examine these results, I am left with a feeling of  skepticism 
regarding the usefulness of  the adjusted trade intensity ratios as indi- 199  Measures of Openness 
cators of trade barriers. I see tastes (Japan’s coffee), omitted resources 
(Iceland’s fish), and historical accidents (Switzerland’s watches). I am 
not  sure that  I  see trade barriers.  What  seems clear is that,  in  the 
absence of  direct measures of  barriers, it will be impossible to deter- 
mine the degree of openness for most countries with much subjective 
confidence. 
Notes 
This research has been partially supported by NSF grant SES 84 19932 and 
by the World  Bank. Able research assistance has been provided by Shu-heng 
Chen and Kishore Gawande. Comments by Robert Baldwin, Anne Krueger, 
Alan Deardorff, and other attendees at the NBER conference are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
1. This model leaves unspecified certain details of  the structure of world 
demand and supply that would determine international product prices. These 
prices may change in response to changes in technology, shifts in world trade 
barriers, or worldwide growth of factor supplies. Policy analysis and econo- 
metric estimation that take international product prices as exogenous will none- 
theless be appropriate provided that countries are small enough that internal 
events such as the imposition of trade barriers have no noticeable effects on 
international prices. 
2. Here I  am assuming that the tariff  proceeds are redistributed  in a lump 
sum or that the government utility function conforms with the private sector. 
3. In the Bayesian language, it would be better to say that the unobservables 
are treated as if they came from a distribution with an infinite variance. 
4. These numbers have been truncated after two decimals, and the columns 
for R, A, and M therefore appear not to add to the column for 0. 
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Comment  Drusilla K. Brown 
Measures of the degree to which countries interfere with international 
commerce have typically been based on a bottom-up approach: mea- 
suring tariff and nontariff barriers, product by product and country by 
country.  Alternatively,  one  could  estimate a  theoretical  model  that 
could predict the pattern and volume of trade under free trade condi- 
tions. The degree to which countries are “open”  can be evaluated by 
comparing actual trade with the pattern of free trade predicted by the 
Drusilla K. Brown is assistant professor of economics at Tufts University. 201  Measures of Openness 
model. Countries that deviate most from the trade pattern predicted 
by the model would be deemed relatively more protectionist. 
This second approach is adopted by Learner in chapter 6, “Measures 
of Openness.” In this chapter, factor endowments of land, labor, cap- 
ital, oil production, and minerals, along with distance and the trade 
balance, are used to predict  net trade within a product category for 
each country. Net trade within a product category is regressed on factor 
endowments for a cross section of countries. A separate equation is 
estimated for each product category. 
While this model does not predict  the pattern of  trade under free 
trade conditions, it would predict trade if  each country were to adopt 
the world’s average level of protection. Thus, a country that trades 
less than the model predicts must have a higher than average level of 
protection, and those that trade more have a lower than average level 
of protection. 
This is an extremely ambitious project and will yield information of 
great interest  to both  academic economists and policymakers. This 
approach is also a great improvement  over measuring openness by 
calculating imports and exports as a fraction of GNP. As the chapter 
points out, such an approach merely  indicates  the degree to which 
countries differ in their factor endowments, not in the level of protection. 
The question  I  address first is, What does this approach tell  us? 
Suppose for a moment we really have found the true model that predicts 
trade, and we have found a country and product for which the regres- 
sion equation fits the pattern of trade poorly. This procedure will tell 
us how a country’s trade pattern is deviating from the average trade 
pattern for countries similarly endowed. If  that is what we mean by 
“openness,”  this is an appropriate procedure. 
However, will this approach tell us which countries are most pro- 
tectionist? In a two-country model, if one country is protectionist the 
trade for both partners will  deviate from the free trade pattern, and 
thus both countries will appear “closed” by this measure. Nonetheless, 
in a world of more than two countries the problem is not very damaging. 
If in a multicountry system some countries are open and trade mutually, 
we would expect that their actual trade pattern would be closely cor- 
related with the free trade pattern, although countries close to protec- 
tionist countries may trade less than expected. 
A second problem along these lines was noted in the chapter. The 
model will give misleading results if similarly endowed countries adopt 
similar structures of  protection.  Countries following the  protection 
standard will appear normal, while countries with peculiar structures 
of protection will  be singled out. 
According to the measures used  in the chapter, a country that is 
peculiar in its choice of  intervention may be “open”  as measured by 202  Edward E. Learner 
the adjusted trade intensity ratio, but will also have a high  index of 
intervention. This discrepancy occurs because the measure of openness 
compares the total amount of  actual trade to the total amount of pre- 
dicted trade. The intervention index, on the other hand, focuses on the 
absolute value of the residuals, thus checking to see if  a country is 
trading in the “right”  product categories. Therefore, a country that 
has a level of  protection equal to the world average but applying to 
unusual product categories will have an appropriate level of trade but 
in the “wrong”  product categories. As a result, the intervention index 
will be high. 
A third problem with the interpretation of results will arise if  some 
factors have a variable supply. Trade barriers that raise the return to 
capital will increase a protectionist country’s “endowment” of capital 
over time. Consequently, if protection in a country has occurred over 
several years, such a country may cease to appear protectionist. 
Problems with interpretation, however, do not pose insurmountable 
obstacles. If we accept the approach, then the next step is the choice 
of a theoretical model. The model chosen must satisfy very stringent 
conditions, for it is insufficient that it be a model with some statistical 
power to explain the pattern of trade. Rather, it must be the model of 
international trade, for all residuals are attributed to protection. 
The framework chosen in the chapter is the n-factor n-good version 
of  the Heckscher-Ohlin  model.  It is hard to imagine that the n  x  n 
version of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem adequately explains the actual 
pattern of  trade for the purposes of this  study.  Factor endowments 
undoubtedly play a role in determining the pattern of trade in goods, 
but there are many other factors, such as differences in taste and the 
presence of scale economies. 
Scale economies, in  particular, pose problems for the factor pro- 
portions theory. A small country may be heavily endowed with an input 
used intensively in the production of a particular good but may not be 
large enough to accommodate a firm that fully exploits the available 
economies of scale. Consequently, the small country may specialize in 
the production of goods produced with constant-returns-to-scale tech- 
nology, while a large country specializes in the increasing-returns-to- 
scale industry. In this event, the model will be biased toward the result 
that small countries are more open than large countries in goods pro- 
duced with increasing returns to scale but less open in goods produced 
with constant returns to scale. For example, scale economies and coun- 
try  size may  explain the unusually  large exports of  aircraft  by  the 
United States or the absence of Austria’s exports of road vehicles. 
A second problem associated with scale economies is that in indus- 
tries dominated by monopolistically competitive firms, trade may occur 203  Measures of Openness 
even between countries with identical tastes and factor endowments. 
In cases where a single monopolistically competitive industry straddles 
two or more product categories, trade in goods will be driven by product 
differentiation. Factor endowments may have little explanatory power. 
A second difficulty with applying the Heckscher-Ohlin model to this 
problem is that higher dimensional trade theory does not predict the 
commodity composition of trade when the number of goods exceeds 
the number of  factors. Rather,  only the direction of factor trade is 
predictable. As a result, it would be more appropriate to use net factor 
trade as the dependent variable rather than net commodity trade. 
For example, watches from Switzerland and beverages from France 
are offered as cases in which the model performed poorly because of 
omitted factors of  production or as the result of an “accident of his- 
tory.”  Similarly, the  model  had  difficulty predicting  the location  of 
petroleum refining. Given the indeterminacy of the pattern of  trade in 
goods when the number of goods exceeds the number of factors, it is 
likely that accidents of history will indeed affect the pattern of trade 
in goods. 
Comparing actual trade against predictions of the n  x  n Heckscher- 
Ohlin theorem thus may be largely a measure of the inadequacies of 
this model, rather than a measure of trade barriers. This is similar to 
the criticism applied to the simple technique of calculating trade as a 
fraction of GNP, which is primarily a measure of the disparity of factor 
endowments among countries. 
However, adopting net factor trade as the dependent variable will 
sidestep the indeterminacy problem when the number of goods exceeds 
the number of factors and should help to resolve some of the difficulties 
associated with trade in products produced with increasing returns to 
scale by monopolistically competitive firms. No matter what the pattern 
of trade in goods in these two instances, it should still be the case that 
factors of production embodied in the net trade bundle will unambig- 
uously reflect relative factor abundance in the absence of protection. 
In these instances, the model predicting trade in goods may perform 
poorly,  while a model predicting trade in  factors could capture the 
essence of trade fairly well. 
Despite these problems, some of the results presented in the chapter 
are highly effective in challenging conventional wisdom. For example, 
according to this study Japan is not dramatically more protectionist 
than the United States, and for most calculations Japan appears to have 
less intrusive barriers to trade. This is a result that many trade econ- 
omists and Japan specialists suspect to be the case, but is not widely 
accepted outside of  the profession. However, some of the results are 
impossible to believe. For example, according to this study one of the 204  Edward E. Learner 
least protected industries in  the United States is meat. Similarly, the 
results suggest that meat is an unprotected sector in Japan, which is 
clearly not the case. 
This method of  detecting protectionism is nevertheless very prom- 
ising. The fundamental problems can be addressed simply by adding a 
few more factors of production, such as coastline for fishing and tropical 
weather conditions, and adopting a more general model that can ac- 
commodate accidents of history,  scale economies, and trade pattern 
indeterminacies of  the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 